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REFLECTIONS ON AUGUSTA: JUDICIAL, LEGISLATIVE
AND ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO PRIVATE RACE
AND GENDER CONSCIOUSNESS
Scott R. Rosner*
In light of the recent controversy surrounding Augusta National Golf Club's
exclusionary membership policy, this Article highlights the myriad incentives and
disincentives that Augusta and similar clubs have for reforming such policies. The
author acknowledges the economic importance of club membership in many busi-
ness communities and addresses the extent to which club members' claims of rights
of privacy and free association are valid. The Article also considers the potential of
judicial action in promoting the adoption of more inclusive membership policy; the
state action doctrine and the First Amendment right to freedom of association are
discussed as frameworks under which litigants may potentially bring claims
against clubs and the author assesses the likelihood of success under each.
This Article next addresses the possibility of using existing legislation to prohibit or
discourage exclusionary membership policies. Though he finds that the frderal leg-
islation on the books (Title II of the Civil Rights Act) falls short as a tool for
combating discrimination, the author finds potential in some states' civil rights
acts. The author also outlines the probable arguments plaintiffs and defendants
would make were a claim brought against an exclusionary club.
Finally, this Article addresses the potential for new federal or state legislation to
combat this type of discrimination, the efficacy of denying liquor licenses and prop-
erty tax exemptions to exclusionary clubs, and the potential normative effect that
could be realized were high-profile athletes, professional tours, concerned club
members, and business communities to make their disapproval of exclusionary
policies heard.
* Lecturer, Legal Studies Department, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania;
B.A. 1992, University of Michigan; M.S. 1993, University of Massachusetts; J.D. 1997, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Law School. This article is dedicated to the loving memory of Lorin K.
Sherman, my sister and friend. I'd like to extend a special thanks to Cora MacLean for her
significant contribution to the first draft of this article. Thanks also to Kim Rosner and
Kenneth Shropshire for their helpful contributions. An earlier version of this article was
presented at the annual conference of the North American .Society for Sport Management,
Virginia Beach, Virginia, June 1, 2001 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Though the 2002 U.S. ('People's') Open golf tournament was
the first to be played on a truly public course, the Masters tourna-
ment continues to be played at Augusta National Golf Club, a
prestigious club that has never had a female member and has fewer
than ten African-Americans among its approximately 300 mem-
bers.' Augusta National Chairman Hootie Johnson's defiant
public response to a letter from the National Council of Women's
Organizations urging the club to admit female members should
not be surprising. Despite the fact that for the first time in history
the best men's golfer and top two women's tennis players are mi-
norities, discrimination remains prevalent in private country
clubs throughout the United States. That people who look just
like Tiger Woods, Serena and Venus Williams, and Annika Soren-
stam would not be allowed to become members at the very places
where their sports are most popular is ironic, yet reflects the cur-
rent realities of the American legal, political, and economic
systems. However, this exclusion is hardly a recent development;
there exists a long tradition of discrimination in American country
clubs against women and ethnic, religious and racial minorities.3
While many overt forms of discrimination have ended in the
years since the Civil Rights Movement, problems persist in other
areas of society. Private country clubs like Augusta National remain
a hotbed of gender and racial discrimination, even as these clubs
retain their importance to business and industry leaders. The ex-
pansion of the corporate boardroom to the golf courses, tennis
courts, locker rooms, dining areas, and bars found at private coun-
try clubs provides members of these clubs with substantial business
advantages and can further career advancement by allowing access
to influential members of the business community, providing
members with the ability to network and cultivate business rela-
1. See Tour Players Lukewarm About Women at Augusta, available at http://
sports.espn.go.com/golf/story?id=1427651.
2. This was acknowledged in a 1996 Nike television commercial in which Tiger
Woods stated, "There are still courses in the United States that I am not allowed to play
because of the color of my skin." See DeWayne Wickham, Tiger Finally Takes a Public Stand-
the Wrong One, USA Today (May 16, 2000) available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/
comment/columnists/wickham/wick095.htm (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
3. See generaUyJOHN H. KENNEDY, A COURSE OF THEIR OWN: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN-
AMERICAN GOLFERS (2000). See a/soJennifer Jolly-Ryan, Chipping Away at Discrimination at the
Country Club, 25 PEPP. L. REv. 495, 496 (1997).




tionships.5 Thus, access to country clubs is now more important
than ever in the business world.
Over the years, many clubs have been criticized for their exclu-
sionary membership policies.' While numerous country clubs have
withstood media criticism, some of these clubs have come under
legal scrutiny, and have been forced either to justify their policies
or prove that they have no legal obligation to change them.7 With
respect to the latter assertion, there are several defenses available
to clubs that allow them to operate free from government interfer-
ence. A threshold argument is the absence of state action in their
exclusive policies, which hinges on the distinction of whether an
entity is public or private.8 A country club may also argue that its
admission policy is a valid assertion of its membership's right to
freedom of association;9 a court encountering this defense must
determine if a group's existence provides it with either expressive
or intimate association rights.' ° Finally, a country club may argue
that it is distinctly private, and thus not a place of public accom-
modation subject to either federal or state legislation addressing
discrimination.
While there are many ways to avoid an unfavorable court ruling,
every country club is further shielded from litigation by the daunt-
ing reality of initiating a lawsuit against a country club whose
membership includes business and community leaders. An indi-
vidual engaging in such defiant behavior risks becoming a social
and economic pariah, ostracized by friends and business associates
for 'shaking things up.' An individual challenging the system may
well be shunned because of this act of defiance."
In Part II, the philosophical approaches to the issue of country
club discrimination will be set forth. In addition, a discussion of
the true value of the country club in today's business environment
is undertaken. In Part III, the case law that is typically involved in a
country club discrimination suit will be reviewed. These topics in-
clude state action, associational freedoms, and state interests. In
Part IV, the federal and state legislation salient to the issue will be
5. Id.
6. Id. at 91.
7. Alternatively, members of the disaffected minority group have often responded by
forming their own country clubs that exclude other types of minorities. See KENNEDY, supra
note 3, at 11-12. See alsoJolly-Ryan, supra note 3, at 496.
8. See Kamp, supra note 4, at 92-94.
9. Id. at 96.
10. Id.
11. The numerous negative implications of initiating change within one's own club are
discussed infra Part V.F.
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addressed, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and numerous
state public accommodation laws. While the Civil Rights Act of
1964 has led to dramatic changes in the lives of many individuals, 2
it has not substantially changed the makeup of most country clubs.
The benefits and shortcomings of this legislation as it applies to
country clubs will be analyzed. State legislation impacting country
clubs has been enacted in several states. 3 The content of these dis-
parate laws will be reviewed in terms of their potential effect of
country club discrimination and judicial interpretations of these
pieces of legislation thus far. In Part V, several alternative solutions
to the problem of country club discrimination will be discussed.
While the aforementioned litigation and legislation may ultimately
lead to the eradication of discrimination in country clubs, it is also
necessary to consider alternative methods of achieving this result.
A variety of possible solutions to the problem and their likelihood
of success will be proposed and analyzed. These remedies include
internal challenges by country club members to discriminatory
practices at their clubs, new federal and/or state legislation, liquor
license regulation, removal of tax-exempt status and property tax
exemptions, external challenges by non-club members, and sanc-
tion by professional golf and tennis organizations. Each of these
singular measures may only effect change at a relatively small
number of country clubs because the appropriate remedy will vary
with the situation of each individual club. However, when consid-
ered collectively, these solutions have the potential to reach a large
number of country clubs and have a profound effect on the land-
scape of a social institution. The article will conclude in Part VI.
II. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS AND THE NOTIONS
OF LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
A. Economic Advantages of Club Membership
Membership in a private country club provides a substantial
business advantage. 14 Members often argue that the country club is
12. See Kamp, supra note 4, at 94-95.
13. Id. at 95.
14. The PGA of America has recognized the advantage gained by private club mem-
bership by its establishment of the 'Golf: For Business & Life' program in 1999. The PGA of
America recently donated $200,000 to the program, which teaches college juniors and sen-
iors about the business opportunities that golf provides. See PGA's Golf: For Business & Life




merely an extension of their homes, and thus the rights that they
enjoy at home extend to the club. Yet this argument ignores the
reality of the business world. The PGA of America has recognized
the advantage of private club membership by establishing the
'Golf: For Business & Life' program to teach college juniors and
seniors about the business opportunities that golf provides. 6 Em-
ployers and the Internal Revenue Service also acknowledge this
reality. Employers frequently reimburse employees' club dues and
related expenses as a perquisite of employment, 17 while the IRS
allows federal income tax deductions to be taken by members of
private clubs.1" There can be no doubt that the country club is an
extension of the marketplace.' 9 Networking is of great importance
in achieving success in business, so much so that it has become a
new business school mantra. Country club membership provides
access to influential members of the business community and the
ability to cultivate business relationships and in a relaxed setting. 2
Opportunities for career advancement into executive positions are
often dependent upon these informal relationships as well,2' with
the result that access to private country clubs can be indispensable
22to career success. The excluded group suffers a tremendous eco-
nomic loss from the denial of private club membership. 3 The
inability to gain access to important business networks ultimately
manifests itself in the exclusion of minorities and women from sig-
nificant parts of the marketplace. The 'glass ceiling' and 'old boy
network' thus remain very much a part of the business community.
The continued toleration of this disadvantage perpetuates the so-
cioeconomic differences between the excluded and non-excluded
groups.
15. See RICHARDJ. Moss, GOLF AND THE AMERICAN COUNTRY CLUB 162 (2001).
16. See Beth Parker, Membership Has Its Privileges: Defiant Private Clubs Are Testing the
Boundaries of Associational Rights, CAL. LAw.,June 1988, at 46, 51 (June 1988).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Editorial, Private Clubs and Private Choices, N.Y. TIMES,June 3, 1980, at A18.
20. See Kamp, supra note 4, at 89, 91.
21. Id. at 91.
22. See Brief of Amici Curiae Conference of Private Organizations, New York State
Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (No. 86-1836).
23. See Kenneth L. Shropshire, Private Race Consciousness, 1996 DET. C.L. Rv. 629, 631.
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B. Equality and Liberty in the Context of Private Country Clubs
Underlying the debate surrounding the eradication of discrimi-
nation in private country clubs is a conflict between fundamental
notions of equality and liberty.24 In the present context, equality
refers to the right of the excluded individuals to be free from
unlawful discrimination, while liberty involves the individual coun-
try club member's right to privacy and freedom of association.
These two concepts require further discussion so that a reasonable
conclusion may be reached as to their relative value in this context.
Private clubs provide a sense of belonging and fellowship and a
pleasurable, relaxing, and comfortable social environment. 5 Such
are the benefits of voluntary associations. These benefits are largely
absent when a person is forced to associate with those he would
rather avoid.26 Alexis de Tocqueville recognized the importance of
private associations in a democratic society and believed that they
should not be limited. 27 He commented,
The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting
for himself, is that of combining his exertions with those of
his fellow creatures and of acting in common with them. The
right of association therefore appears to me almost as inalien-
able in its nature as the right of personal liberty. No legislator
can attack it without impairing the foundations of society.
2s
The Supreme Court echoed de Tocqueville's beliefs in explain-
ing that liberty is protected by the right of association, stating,
[C]ertain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role
in the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and
transmitting shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster di-
versity and act as critical buffers between the individual and
the power of the State .... Moreover, the constitutional shel-
ter afforded such relationships reflects the realization that
individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from
close ties with others. Protecting these relationships from un-
warranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability
24. See Moss, supra note 15, at 191.
25. See Brief of Amici Curiae California State Club Association and National Club
Association at 5, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699).
26. Id. at 7.




to define one's identity that is central to any concept of lib-
erty.29
The freedom of association is not limited to choosing the indi-
viduals with whom one chooses to form relationships; it also
encompasses the right to refuse to form relationships with indi-
viduals. The Supreme Court has recognized this principle, writing,
"There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal
structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces
the group to accept members it does not desire ... Freedom of
association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not to associ-
ate."30 Favoring liberty over equality by protecting the private
country club's right to discriminate constitutes judicial validation
of discrimination and the denial of equal opportunities to all citi-
zens, and contributes to a lack of social integration." Yet as a
former Supreme Courtjustice explained:
Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the
constitutional right of every person to close his home or club
to any person or to choose his social intimates and business
partners solely on the basis of personal prejudices including
race. These and other rights pertaining to privacy and private
association are themselves constitutionally permitted liber-
ties.32
Such support for the discriminatory practices of country clubs
was later found in another Justice's dissenting opinion: "The First
Amendment and the related guarantees of the Bill of Rights ...
create a zone of privacy which precludes government from inter-
fering with private clubs ... Government may not tell a man or
woman who his or her associates must be. The individual can be as
selective as he desires."
3
The benefits of choosing equality over liberty are numerous.
The psychological effects of discrimination are daunting: feelings
of worthlessness and hopelessness, depression, and lowered self-
esteem are common amongst individuals suffering from the stigma
29. Roberts v. U.S.Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984) (citation omitted).
30. Id. at 623.
31. Thomas H. Sawyer, Private Golf Clubs: Freedom of Expression and the Right to Privacy, 3
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 187, 202-04 (1993).
32. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (GoldbergJ., concurring).
33. Moose Lodge 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972) (Douglas,J., dissenting).
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of discrimination. 4 The social effects of discrimination are similarly
troubling. The stereotyping of minority groups and lack of diversity
lead to societal discord and a general lack of understanding be-
tween individuals. Finally, the financial effects of discrimination
are significant when segments of the population are essentially ex-
cluded from achieving economic prosperity due to the
discrimination that forces them to exist away from the upper-end
of the socioeconomic strata. Ending discrimination at private
country clubs can thus have enormous psychological, social, and
economic consequences. Preventing stigmatization, leveling the
financial playing field, ending the perpetuation of stereotypes, and
promoting diversity are among these benefits. The costs of favoring
equality over liberty by eradicating discrimination at private coun-
try clubs are the impairment of the freedom to associate and right
of privacy.3 6
The underlying assumption of this analysis is that in the area of
discrimination at private country clubs, the interest in equality
outweighs the interest in liberty. The goal of ending discrimination
in this realm of society supersedes the individual country club
member's right to privacy and freedom of association. The
Supreme Court has stated that associations at private country clubs
are "clearly outside of the category of relationships worthy of this




No discussion of country club discrimination can be undertaken
without an analysis of the state action doctrine. This threshold is-
sue is frequently debated in litigation involving country clubs. 38
Absent legislation deeming a club a place of public accommoda-
tion, a lack of state involvement in a club's actions will prevent a
court from evaluating a party's underlying discrimination claim
against a club.39 There are three theories by which state action can
34. SeeJolly-Ryan, supra note 3, at 497-98.
35. Id.
36. See Sawyer, supra note 31, at 204-05.
37. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
38. See Kamp, supra note 4, at 92-94.
39. Id.
[VOL. 37:1
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be established. First, state action can be found when the group in
question is serving a public function. ° More specifically, state ac-
tion is present "where a private concern provides goods or services
traditionally performed as a government function."4' The second
theory of state action, the state compulsion theory, asserts that state
action will be found "where a government becomes so involved in a
private entity that it encourages or requires conduct."42 The third
43theory of state action is the nexus theory, also called the joint ac-
tion theory. Its reasoning provides that state action is found "where
government judicially enforces a private party's right to discrimi-
nate in a racially restrictive covenant."
44
Courts have swayed between narrow and broad readings of state
action in the context of private clubs. Two cases that demonstrate
this inconsistency are Daniel v. Paul,4' and Moose Lodge No. 7 v.
irV S.
46
1. Daniel v. Paul-In 1969, two African-American residents of
Little Rock, Arkansas, brought suit against the Lake Nixon Club,
an amusement park facility owned by Paul. 47 The plaintiffs claimed
that the club's exclusion of African-American members was in vio-
lation of Title II of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits racial,
ethnic, and religious discrimination at places of public accommo-
dation that affected commerce.48 The distinction between private
and public accommodations became the focus of the case for the
U.S. Supreme Court,49 which evaluated this issue according to the
standards set forth in Sections 201 (b) and 201 (c) of Title II.
5
0
40. Id. at 92-93.
41. Id. at 92; see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See also Kamp, supra note 4.
42. Id. at 92-93; see Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
43. See Kamp, supra note 4, at 93-94.
44. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
45. 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
46. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
47. 395 U.S. at 300.
48. 395 U.S. at 301.
49. The district court found that the club was not private, since it was "open to all
members of the white race who were members." Id. In other words, entrance into the park
was not based on paid membership, or status in any organization. Entrance was granted
simply on the basis of race. Id. Thus, the District Court found that the park was clearly not a
private club. 263 F. Supp. at 418. The Supreme Court affirmed this finding of fact, 395 U.S.
298, 302, and the defendants did not dispute this fact. Id. The defendants did, however,
dispute the notion that the park was a place of public accommodation. Id. at 305.
50. 395 U.S. at 302-03.
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The Court examined the four categories of establishments that
are defined as places of public accommodation under 201 (b)."
The following three were deemed relevant:
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter,
soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in
selling food for consumption on the premises, in-
cluding, but not limited to, any such facility located
on the premises of any retail establishment; or any
gasoline station;
(3) any motion picture house, theater, concert hall,
sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition
or entertainment; and
(4) any establishment (A) ... (ii) within the premises
of which is physically located any such covered es-
tablishment, and (B) which holds itself out as
serving patrons of such covered establishment.
52
The plaintiffs argued that the park fell within the ambit of sec-
tion 201 (b) (2), since the country club in question was engaged in
selling food for consumption on the premises.
The Court also evaluated Title II as it applies to the term "affect-
ing commerce." Section 201 (c) establishes standards for determin-
ing whether the operations of an establishment affect commerce
within the meaning of Title II:
The operations of an establishment affect commerce within
the meaning of this title if ... (2) in the case of an establish-
ment described in paragraph (2) ... it serves or offers to
serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food
which it serves, or gasoline or other products which it sells,
has moved in commerce; (3) in the case of an establishment
described in paragraph (3) ... it customarily presents films,
performances, athletic teams, exhibitions, or other sources of
entertainment which move in commerce; and (4) in the case
of an establishment described in paragraph (4) ... there is
physically located within its premises, an establishment the
operations of which affect commerce within the meaning of
this subsection. For purposes of this section, 'commerce'
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (b) (2001)).
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means travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or
communication among the several States.
The plaintiffs asserted that the park fell under 201 (c) (4) .5 In re-
sponse to both claims by the petitioners, the Court found that "the
snack bar is 'principally engaged in selling food for consumption
on the premises.' ,5 Relying on the fact that many of the park's pa-
trons were from out of the state, and that as a result, much of the
food sold was involved in interstate commerce, the Court found
that the park was a place of public accommodation.6
In addition, the Court found that the club solicited interstate
travelers, as evidenced by its advertising outside of the state.57 Fi-
nally, the Court determined that the operations of the club
"'affect[ed] commerce,'" as its customary sources of entertain-
ment, including the club's juke box and boats, were bought from
out of state sources . 8 The legislative history of Title II indicated
that Congress intended mechanical sources of entertainment such
as these to be within the meaning of Section 201 (c) (3) .5
The decision in Daniel established that there are a substantial
number of factors that could establish a club as a place of public
accommodation and hence a state actor within the purview of the
antidiscrimination laws. The Supreme Court's holding in Daniel is
instructive as to the application of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, and the opinion has served as a model for state legislation
that deems private clubs a place of public accommodation subject
to state antidiscrimination laws. The broad application of Title 11 in
Daniel contrasts with the Supreme Court's narrower interpretation
of the scope of the Act in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis.'
2. Moose Lodge v. Irvis-Mr. Irvis, an African American guest of a
white member, was refused service at the bar and dining area of a
Moose Lodge solely because of his race.61 This policy was set by the
Supreme Lodge, the governing body of the Moose Lodge that lim-
ited membership to white males.62 Irvis claimed that state action
was present because the state of Pennsylvania had issued the Lodge
53. Id. at 303 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (c) (2001)).
54. Id. at 303-04.
55. Id. at 304.
56. Id. at 305-07.
57. Id. at 304.
58. Id. at 308.
59. Id. at 307.
60. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
61. Id. at 165.
62. Id. at 165-66.
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a liquor license, and thus the Lodge's discrimination involved state
action and was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.53 Irvis sought injunctive relief to revoke
this license until the Lodge ended its discriminatory policies. 4 The
trial court found the Lodge's membership and guest policies to be
discriminatory and constituted state action, and granted the in-
junction. The Moose Lodge subsequently appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court spent significant effort considering the is-
sue of state action! 6 The Lodge was a local chapter of a national
organization, housed in a privately owned building, to which only
members and their invited guests were admitted. 6' The Court
found that there was no Fourteenth Amendment violation, as there
was no state action. 8 The Court disregarded the idea that the issu-
ance of a liquor license constituted state action, stating,
[T]he court has never held ... that discrimination by an
otherwise private entity would be violative of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause if the private entity receives any sort of benefit or
service at all from the state ... Since state-furnished services in-
clude such necessities of life such as electricity, water, and
police and fire protection, such a holding would utterly emas-
culate the distinction between private as distinguished from
state conduct.69
The decision in Moose Lodge demonstrates that mere government
licensing of a club does not constitute state action. Absent a find-
ing of state action, a club will be exempted from constitutional
scrutiny unless it can be established that the club is a public
accommodation.
B. Freedom of Association
All individuals rely on certain freedoms that are essential to es-
tablishing our identity. One of these freedoms, safeguarded by the
63. Id. at 165.
64. Id.
65. 318 F. Supp. 1246 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
66. 407 U.S. 163, 171-79.
67. Id. at 171.
68. Id. at 171-72.
69. Id. at 173.
[VOL. 37:1
Reflections on Augusta
Constitution, is that of association."' The Supreme Court has con-
cluded that "choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate
human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by
the state because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding
the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional
scheme."7
This freedom is further defined by distinguishing two separate
types of association-intimate and expressive. Intimate association
involves personal affiliations that are distinguished by characteris-
tics such as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in
decisions to begin and maintain affiliations, and seclusion from
others in critical aspects of the relationship.72 Thus, the freedom of
intimate association encompasses the whole of personal relation-
ships that people have with one another and all of the aspects of
these relationships.
Expressive association was incorporated into the First Amend-
ment based on the principle that "[a]n individual's freedom to
speak, to worship, and to petition the government for redress of
grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by
the state unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort
toward those ends were not also guaranteed."7 3 Expressive associa-
tion is based on a group's size, purpose, policies, selectivity,
congeniality, and other characteristics.
74
While both types of association are of great importance, intimate
association has been protected by courts more than its counter-
part. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution's
definition of intimate relationships to reflect the realization that
individuals gain a great deal from their relationships with others,
and that the Bill of Rights affords for the preservation of these
highly personal relationships from unjustified interference by the
State.7 '
The Supreme Court has taken a different view of expressive
association. There are several ways in which the expressive
association right could potentially be unconstitutionally infringed
upon, including, but not limited to: the imposition of penalties or
withholding of benefits from individual members because of their
membership in a disfavored group; an attempt to require
70. SeeRoberts v. U.S.Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 620.
73. Id. at 622.
74. Id. at 620.
75. Id. at 618.
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disclosure of facts of membership in a group seeking anonymity;
and the attempt to interfere with the internal organization or
affairs of the group. 6 Thus, it would appear that clubs or
organizations have a large umbrella under which to conduct
activities free from governmental involvement. However, the Court
has concluded that the right to associate for expressive purposes is
not absolute. 7' There are certain social objectives that are
sufficiently compelling to warrant state involvement in seemingly
private affairs, including the eradication of discrimination. 78 The
Court considered the abridgement of the right to engage in
expressive association in favor of compelling social objectives in
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of
Duarte, and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.
1. Roberts v. United States Jaycees-In 1984, the Minnesota
Department of Human Rights filed a lawsuit against the Jaycees
alleging that the organization's policy of excluding women from
membership violated the Minnesota Civil Rights Act. 79 The peti-
tioners acted when the national Board of Directors notified two
local chapters of the Jaycees in Minneapolis and St. Paul that they
were in danger of losing their charters because they admitted
women as members.80
In response to the lawsuit, the Minnesota Human Rights De-
partment scheduled a hearing to assess the merits of the case.8'
Prior to the hearing, the Jaycees had sought injunctive relief
against several state officials to prevent the enforcement of the
Act. 2 The Jaycees claimed that forcing the organization to accept
women members would violate its male members' constitutional
rights to free speech and association and that the Act was unconsti-
tutionally vague and overbroad.83
After the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, and held that the Minne-
sota Human Rights Act that forced the Jaycees to admit women as
full members violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
8 4
76. Id. at 622-23.
77. Id. at 623.
78. Id. at 623.
79. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03, subd. 3 (West 1982). The Act states, "It is an unfair
discriminatory practice to: (1) deny any person of the full and equal enjoyment of goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accom-
modation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin, or sex."
80. 468 U.S. at 614.
81. Id. at 615.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 615-16.
84. U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983).
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Thus, the Court had several issues to review. At the outset, the
Court set out to determine whether the Act violated the male
members' freedom of association, either intimate or expressive.
s5
The Supreme Court began this inquiry by determining what typeS 86,
of association was at issue. Initially the Court looked to accepted
standards for establishing intimate association: relative smallness, a
high degree of selectivity in decision making, and seclusion from
817others in critical aspects of the relationship. When these stan-
dards were applied, the Court found that the Jaycees did not
represent an intimate association for several reasons. First, local
chapters of the national organization were large and basically unse-
lective, with 430 members in Minneapolis and 400 in St. Paul."'
Second, there were no standards or qualifications necessary to be-
come a member of theJaycees 9 Third, in evaluating whether there
was seclusion from others, the Court noted that women members,
although non-voting, were involved in all other aspects of the or-
ganization, and thus there seemed no reasonable justification for
the Jaycees' claim that admitting women as members would be a
hindrance to the male members.0
The Court then evaluated whether the Jaycees had established
an expressive association by analyzing whether the organization
engaged in behavior such as speech, religious worship, and peti-
tioning of the government, all of which are protected by the
Constitution. 1 The Supreme Court found that the group met with
the purpose of expressing certain views or ideas, and thus there
was an expressive association present. Next, the Court looked to
determine whether the Minnesota Human Rights Act unconstitu-
tionally violated this right to expressive association. In general, the
state must demonstrate that there exists a compelling state interest
sufficient to justify government regulation in order for the legisla-
tion to withstand constitutional scrutiny.9 2 The Court was
persuaded that "Minnesota's compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination against its female citizens justifie [d] the impact that
application of the statute to the Jaycees may have on the male
members' associational freedoms. 9 3 The Court also found that
85. 468 U.S. at 617-29.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 620.
88. Id. at 621.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 621.
91. Id. at 622-23.
92. Id. at 623.
93. Id.
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there was no reason to conclude that the "admission of women as
full voting members [would] impede the organization's ability to
engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred
views.
9 4
The Court further analyzed this issue by reviewing previous deci-
sions addressing the Equal Protection Clause and its relation to
racial and gender discrimination.95 The Court noted that its prior
decisions repeatedly hinged on the fact that stereotype-based dis-
crimination forces those being oppressed to labor under often
completely unfounded assumptions. Thus, such discrimination
"deprives persons of their individual dignity and denies society the
benefits of wide participation in political, economic, and cultural
life."9'7 Accordingly, the Court asserted that preventing such dis-
crimination should be a significant issue in the court and the
legislature.
The decision in Roberts was an important step toward preventing
discrimination by country clubs. However, there is a fundamental
difference between large national organizations, such as the Jay-
cees, and small, local country clubs: the private country club may
be more likely to establish an intimate association, which would
make the standard of protection afforded to it substantially higher.
The Supreme Court next considered the issue in Board of Directors
of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte.
98
2. Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte-Rotary Interna-
tional is a nonprofit corporation of business and professional men
with the purpose to provide "humanitarian service, encourage high
ethical standards in all vocations, and help build goodwill and
peace in the world."99 Individual members belong to a local Rotary
Club, and each club is a member of Rotary International.' °° Mem-
bership in Rotary Clubs was open only to men.'0' The organization
claimed that its exclusion of women resulted in a sense of fellow-
ship among the male members and allowed it to operate in foreign
countries that held different attitudes toward women and frowned
upon mixed-gender clubs.9 2 In 1977, the Rotary Club of Duarte
went against these accepted practices and admitted three women
94. Id. at 627.
95. Id. at 625.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
99. Id. at 539.
100. Id.




as active members. 0 3 Rotary International, its parent organization,
then revoked the Duarte Club's charter.' 4 The Duarte Club and
two of the women asserted that Rotary International's actions were
in violation of California's Unruh Civil Rights Act.00 The Duarte
Club lost in a bench trial in California Superior Court but was suc-
cessful in the California Court of Appeal.'0 6 In both, the focus was
on determining if Rotary Clubs were "business establishments" un-
der the Unruh Act.'0 7 The U.S. Supreme Court extended this focus
to include the issue of associational freedoms.
With respect to the issue of intimate association, the Court
stated that "the evidence in this case indicates that the relationship
among Rotary Club members is not the kind of intimate or private
association that warrants constitutional protection.""' The Court
found that guests or members of the public were often present at
Rotary activities, that Rotary members were encouraged to invite
their business associates to meetings, and that there was no limit
on the number of members in any local Rotary Club.'09
The Court cited Roberts on the issue of expressive association, stat-
ing that " ... the right to engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment implies 'a corresponding right to associate with others
in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educa-
tional, religious, and cultural ends.' ""0 The Court found that Rotary
International failed to demonstrate that the admission of women
would affect its members' ability to carry out the clubs' purposes in
any significant way."' The Unruh Act did not require that the Rotary
Club abandon its basic goals, classification system, or admit mem-




Further, the Court found that even if the Unruh Act did infringe
slightly on the Rotary members' freedom of expressive association,
this infringement would be justified by the state's compelling inter-
est in eliminating apparent gender discrimination. ' 3 As with its
decision in Roberts, the Supreme Court determined that the organi-




106. Id. at 542.
107. Id. at 542-43.
108. Id. at 546.
109. Id.
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seeing that the purpose of the Unruh Act-the eradication of dis-
crimination-was carried OUt.
114
3. New York State Club Association v. City of New Yorkl'5-New York
City's Human Rights Law was enacted in 1965.116 The original piece
of legislation forbade "discrimination based on race, creed, sex
and other grounds by any 'place of public accommodation, resort
or amusement,' but specifically exempted 'any institution, club or
place of accommodation which in its nature is distinctly private.'""'
Local Law 63 was passed as an amendment to the city's Human
Rights Law in 1984.15
With this amendment, the New York legislators sought to
broaden the traditional goals and purposes of civil rights legisla-
tion. Specifically, the legislation sought to stretch the Human
Rights Law to reach any "institution, club or place of accommoda-
tion [that] has more than four hundred members, provides
regular meal service and regularly receives payment for dues, fees,
use of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages directly or indi-
rectly from or on behalf of nonmembers for the furtherance of
trade or business." 9 The legislative history of the statute made
clear that it was intended to include country clubs and demon-
strated that New York's City Council had recognized the
importance of such clubs in the business arena.1 20 While the origi-
nal scope of civil rights legislation was limited to actual businesses
or public places, this new legislation targeted the purpose of such
places. The City Council determined that "'the public interest in
114. Id.
115. 487U.S. 1 (1988).
116. Jd. at 4.
117. Id. at 1.
118. Id. at 5-6 ("[T]he city of New York has a compelling interest in providing its citi-
zens an environment where all persons, regardless of race, creed, color, national origin or
sex, have a fair and equal opportunity to participate in the business and professional life of
the city, and may be unfettered in availing themselves of employment opportunities. Al-
though city, state and federal laws have been enacted to eliminate discrimination in
employment, women and minority group members have not attained equal opportunity in
business and the professions. One barrier to the advancement of women and minorities in
the business and professional life of the city is the discriminatory practices of certain mem-
bership organizations where business deals are often made and personal contacts valuable
for business purposes, employment and professional advancement are formed. While such
organizations may avowedly be organized for social, cultural, civic or educational purposes,
and while many perform valuable services to the community, the commercial nature of
some of the activities occurring therein and the prejudicial impact of these activities on
business, professional and employment opportunities of minorities and women cannot be
ignored.").
119. Id. at 6 (citing N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102 (9) (1986)).
120. Id. at 16.
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equal opportunity' outweighs 'the interest in private association
asserted by club members.' ,,121
As soon as the amendment became effective, the New York State
Club Association filed a suit against the City of New York. The As-
sociation asserted that the amendment was both invalid and
unconstitutional on its face under the First and the Fourteenth
Amendments. 2 2 The Association lost at the trial court level and
subsequently lost on appeal at the intermediate state appellate
level. The New York Court of Appeals also ruled for the city, find-
ing that "any infringement on associational rights is amply justified
by the city's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination
against women and minorities."
23
The New York State Club Association first challenged the facial
constitutionality of the 1984 law. In order to prevail on this argu-
ment, the appellant needed to show that "the challenged law
either 'could never be applied in a valid manner,' or that even
though it may be validly applied to the plaintiff and others, it nev-
ertheless is so broad that it 'may inhibit the constitutionally
protected speech of third parties.' ,,124 When addressing these chal-
lenges, the Supreme Court noted that "the first kind of facial
challenge will not succeed unless the court finds that 'every appli-
cation of the statute created an impermissible risk of suppression
of ideas,"25 and the second kind of facial challenge will not succeed
unless the statute is 'substantially' overbroad.' 2 6 This would require
the Court to find "a realistic danger that the statute itself will sig-
nificantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of
parties not before the court."
27
The New York State Club Association conceded that, at least in
part, the law could be constitutionally applied to some of its mem-
bers; 28 namely, those with more than 400 members that provide
regular meal service. The Supreme Court stated that "these charac-
teristics ... significant in defining the nonprivate nature of these
associations, because of the kind of role that strangers play in their
ordinary existence, as is the regular participation of strangers at
121. N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of NewYork, 487 U.S. 1, 6 (1988).
122. Id. at 7.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 11 (citing City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
798 (1984)).
125. Id. (citing Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 798 n.15).
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 801).
128. Id.atll-12.
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meetings, which we emphasized in Roberts and Rotary."'" ' In other
words, the Court believed that social clubs, including country
clubs, had characteristics that made them unmistakably business
oriented. The Court found that although some of the interaction
between club members may be private or intimate in nature, that
alone did not afford the clubs protection from government inter-
action against discriminatory practices.' 30 Thus, the Court
determined that the statute was not unconstitutional on its face
because it did not infringe on the rights of every member of the
Association.
131
The Court found similar problems with the appellant's argu-
ment that the statute imposed upon its freedom of expressive
association.3 2 The Court looked to the intention of the statute, and
found that the law did not impose on any club in a way that would
inhibit the freedom to form associations of either a private or pub-
133lic nature. The statute merely forbade the practice of
discriminating based on race, sex, and other specific characteris-
tics, but allowed clubs to maintain the practice of turning away
those people with whom they did not share common viewpoints.
4
The appellant next argued that the statute was overbroad in that
it covered clubs that were "distinctly private." 35 Here, the appellant
erred by neglecting to provide any description of what features
such clubs possessed that would make them any different than
those for which the statute had already been deemed constitu-
tional. Without any criteria to evaluate, the Court decided that the
statute could not be found to be overbroad and that any over-
breadth could be addressed on a case-by-case basis.13
The Supreme Court's decision in New York State Club Association
demonstrated that New York City was allowed to broaden the
original boundaries established by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
legislation in question went to the very heart of the problem involv-
ing country clubs: that while they may be formed for a social
purpose, the resulting relationships are a vital part of the business
world, and, consequently, discrimination in determining member-
ship puts those in excluded groups at a severe disadvantage in the
business world. New York State Club Association is the only Supreme




133. Id. at 13.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 14.
136. Id.
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Court decision that involved specific guidelines regarding the
number of members required to include a private club within the
ambit of the law. Other cities and states have been encouraged by
the court's decision in New York State Club Association to develop new
and creative methods to force private country clubs to open their
membership policies through the regulation of government bene-
fits and privileges such as liquor licenses and tax exemptions.
1
31
An analysis of Roberts, Rotary, and New York City yields the ines-
capable conclusion that the Court favored equality over the liberty
interests of the club members. Yet the Supreme Court's revisiting
of the issue in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 3 raised some important
questions about the future of cases involving discrimination in pri-
vate organizations of all types.
4. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale-James Dale, a homosexual
member of the Boy Scouts of America since 1978, filed a complaint
against the organization in 1992 after he was informed that his
status as an adult member was being revoked due to his sexual ori-
entation. 3 9 Dale sued under New Jersey's public accommodations
statute, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation in places of public accommodation. 14 The New Jersey
Superior Court ruled that the Boy Scouts were a private organiza-
tion, and thus exempt from the statute.14 1 The state's Court of
Appeals reversed, and its ruling that the organization was covered
under the state's public accommodations statute was affirmed by
the New Jersey Supreme Court.14 2 The United States Supreme
Court granted the Boy Scouts' petition for certiorari to determine
if the application of the state's public accommodations law was in
violation of the First Amendment.1
43
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision concentrated on the
issues of intimate and expressive association.'" The court found that
the Boy Scouts' "large size, nonselectivity, inclusive rather than
exclusive purpose, and practice of inviting or allowing nonmembers
to attend meetings, establish that the organization is not 'sufficiently
personal or private to warrant constitutional protection' under the
137. See Moss, supra note 15, at 162. These regulations will be discussed at length in sec-
tion V infra.
138. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
139. Id. at 645. Dale was told that his suspension from the organization was due to the
fact that the Boy Scouts "specifically forbid membership to homosexuals." Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 646.
143. Id. at 647.
144. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196,1219-28.
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freedom of intimate association.' 015" Similarly, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the Boy Scouts' expressive association
rights were not violated by the inclusion of Dale in its membership;
the Boy Scouts ability to express its message was not infringed
because the members of the group did not associate for the
purpose of disseminating their views on homosexuality.146 The
United States Supreme Court did not address the issue of intimate
association. Instead, it focused on the issue of expressive
association.
In order to establish the existence of an expressive association, a
group must demonstrate that they engage in some sort of expres-
sion, either public or private.14 The Supreme Court reviewed the
Boy Scouts' Oath and Laws, after which they determined that the
general mission of the Boy Scouts was "to instill values in young
people" by promoting "morally straight" behavior. 4 8 The Supreme
Court found that it was "indisputable that an association that seeks
to transmit such a system of values engages in expressive activity.' 4"
After it established the existence of an expressive association,
the Court turned to the issue of whether or not the inclusion of a
homosexual as an adult member would severely affect its members'
freedom of association. The Court found that the Boy Scouts' as-
sertion that homosexuality is contrary to the organization's view of
"morally straight" behavior could be found in other cases in the
past, and thus the Court did not doubt that this view was sincere.1
5
0
The Court then looked to determine whether admitting Dale
would significantly affect the organization's ability to succeed in its
goal not to "promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of
behavior.'"' The Court found that Dale's open and honest stance
in the community as a homosexual would "at the very least ... send
a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy
Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behav-
ior.
,, 152
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the NewJersey
Supreme Court's conclusion that the Boy Scouts did not engage in
expressive association for several reasons. First, the Court noted
that the Boy Scouts did not have to meet for the purpose of ex-
145. Boy Scouts of America, 540 U.S. at 646.
146. Id. at 654-55.
147. Id. at 648.
148. Id. at 649-50.
149. Id. at 650.
150. Id. at 651-52.




pressing the belief that homosexuality is wrong; they merely had to
engage in expressive activity.,53 The New Jersey Supreme Court
pointed out that the Boy Scouts discourage their leaders from dis-
cussing sexual issues with scouts and determined that sexual
preference would not be a major issue, a point with which the Boy
Scouts disagreed.1 54 However, the United States Supreme Court
held that forbidding the discussion of sexual matters did not nec-
essarily imply that the organization's beliefs on specific sexual
matters were not sincere. 15  Although the Scouts did not openly
denounce homosexuality, in the Court's view the failure to do so
did not necessarily demonstrate that the Scouts did not whole-
heartedly believe that the lifestyle is morally wrong.
156
The Court further found that although the Boy Scouts allowed
heterosexual members to disagree publicly with the organization's
view on homosexuality, this was entirely different from allowing a
homosexual to become an adult member. 17 The organization's ex-
pressive association rights are not limited simply because all
members do not agree with the belief or action in question, as "the
Boy Scouts takes an official position with respect to homosexual
conduct, and that is sufficient for First Amendment purposes."''5
For all of these reasons the United States Supreme Court deter-
mined that the NewJersey Supreme Court had erred in finding for
Dale, and held that the application of New Jersey's public accom-
modations law to the Boy Scouts violated its members' rights to
expressive association.
5
This decision could have important implications in future cases
involving country club discrimination. The facts in the Dale case
are significantly different than those in a case involving a country
club, simply because the Court determined that the Boy Scouts
were too large and inclusive to exhibit an intimate association. The
Court instead relied on the fact that the general mission of the or-
ganization was to promote certain values in finding that the Boy
Scouts engaged in a constitutionally protected expressive associa-
tion. This ruling--decided with only an expressive association at
issue-raises two interesting questions: 1) could a country club
claim that it, too, was organized to promote certain values; and




157. Id. at 655-56.
158. Id. at 655.
159. Id. at 656.
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2) if so, what values could it be attempting to instill? The ruling in
Dale could allow private country clubs to make subtle changes in
their bylaws or codes that could allow them to claim a similar pur-
pose and provide protection from invasion by the state.)6
I V. LEGISLATION
A. Federal Legislation
The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 represented a great
victory for the Civil Rights Movement. Congress enacted this piv-
otal legislation to combat discrimination in many aspects of society,
including housing (Title VI) employment (Title VII) and educa-
tion (Title IX). Title II of the Act addresses racial, religious, and
ethnic discrimination in places of public accommodation. 6" The
Act has been quite successful in eliminating many forms of overt
discrimination in most aspects of society.' 62 However, the Act also
provides an exemption from its provisions for bona fide private
clubs, enabling these clubs to continue their discriminatory prac-
tices. It has been suggested by one prominent commentator that
"[t] he sponsors of Title II were led to believe that without a private
club exemption, the whole of Title II might go down to defeat.'
6 4
Yet the meaning of the term 'private club' in Title II is left unde-
fined, and the Supreme Court has failed to remedy the situation by
leaving this task to the various lower federal courts, state courts and
legislatures that have considered the issue.'6 5 Thus, discrimination
within this setting has remained as a result of the interpretation of
the exemption provided by the courts and legislatures faced with
this issue. The determination of whether a club is distinctly private
is a fact-sensitive inquiry;16 6 factors such as the club's size, selectivity
160. For example, a club could include bylaws that a particular religion is against its be-
liefs. This would limit the possibility for membership by followers of that religion, many of
whom could be members of minority groups in the United States.
161. See42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2001).
162. See Shropshire, supra note 23, at 631-32.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (e) provides that "[t]he provisions of [42 USCS §§ 2000a-2000a-
6] shall not apply to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public,
except to the extent that the facilities of such establishment are made available to the cus-
tomers or patrons of an establishment within the scope of subsection (b)." In addition, the
Act does not prohibit gender discrimination.
164. See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW § 3.7 at 138 (3d ed.
1992).
165. See Shropshire, supra note 23, at 643-44.
166. SeeJolly-Ryan, supra note 3, at 500.
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in membership, the procedural formalities followed by the club,
the membership's control over the governance of the club, the
club's history, the use of the club's facilities by nonmembers, and
the club's purpose are emphasized by courts and legislatures.67
The private club exemption and corresponding uncertainty in the
interpretation of this standard make Title II of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 an unlikely weapon for those combating discrimination
within private country clubs.
B. State Legislation
Currently, the laws in each state fall short of establishing a clear
precedent to be followed in cases involving country club discrimi-
nation. These result-oriented laws are well-intentioned but offer
little guidance to judges considering this issue. One solution to this
problem entails states following the model established by Congress
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and adopting their own forms of
168'civil rights legislation. The vast majority of states have done so,
and have subsequently further expanded existing state civil rights
laws by enacting public accommodations laws that typically define
'public accommodations' quite broadly,169 thus bringing many pri-
vate country clubs within the ambit of these laws.' 7° Generally, this
reduces the burden placed on the courts to determine if a club is a
state actor or a place of public accommodation. While the laws in
these states do not specifically address discrimination in private
country clubs, courts have interpreted them as doing so when the
clubs do not meet certain criteria.' 71 Other states have adopted laws
that specifically address country club discrimination. 7 2 This section
will describe state legislation affecting country clubs and challenges
brought under existing state legislation in California and Massa-
chusetts, beginning with California's Unruh Act, which has proven
noteworthy in the state's legal framework.
1. Unruh Civil Rights Act (California)-While the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 was one of the most important pieces of federal legislation
ever enacted, it failed to clearly enunciate a bright-line standard as
167. See Shropshire, supra note 23, at 644. See atsoJolly-Ryan, supra note 3, at 510-15.
168. See Kamp, supra note 4, at 95.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 101-02.
172. See Stephen Goodwin, Ladies in Waiting, THE MET GOLFER, Sept./Oct. 1998.
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to the definition of a private organization. 73 This places a burden
on the judiciary, as they are forced to make a threshold decision on
this matter before determining the merits of the underlying claim.
Where the federal statute is lacking, the Unruh Act is unmistakably
clear. The Act states that, "All persons ... are free and equal, no
matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national ori-
gin, or disability, are entitled to full and equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities, privileges or services in all business estab-
lishments of every kind whatsoever." 174 This statement is quite
broad, and thus needs judicial clarification in order to be effective
in cases involving private clubs. Such clarification was given in
Warfield v. Peninsula Golf and Country Club.
75
Mary Ann Warfield brought suit against the Peninsula Golf and
Country Club in 1981, claiming that the club's membership poli-
cies were illegal under the Unruh Act in that they excluded women
from holding full regular family memberships. 76 The plaintiff and
her husband had been members of the club since 1970 when her
husband obtained a regular family membership in his name.177
Throughout the marriage, the couple frequented the club and es-
tablished both social and business relationships with many
members.7 8 The plaintiff and her husband divorced in 1981, and
the plaintiff requested that the club's board of directors transfer
the Regular Family Membership previously held by her husband
into her name.' 7 When the board cited the club's bylaws in refus-
ing this request, Ms. Warfield initiated the suit.'80
Warfield set out to establish that the Peninsula Golf and Country
Club fell within the definition of a 'business establishment' under
the Unruh Act."' While the Act's definition of such an establish-
ment is extremely broad,' 2 the California Supreme Court set out to
determine whether a private country club was a business estab-
173. See Shropshire, supra note 23, at 639-40 (citing DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE,
RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW § 3.7 (3d ed. 1992)).
174. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 2001).
175. 896 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1995).
176. Id. at 782.
177. Id. at 781.
178. Id. at 781-82.
179. Id. at 782.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 782-83.
182. Section 51 of the Unruh Civil Rights Act provides that "[a]ll persons within the ju-
risdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion,
ancestry, national origin, disability or medical condition are entitled to the full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments
of every kind whatsoever." 913 CAL. STATS. § 3 (1992). See also 896 P.2d at 777.
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lishment. 3 The court found that "traditionally, statutes prohibiting
discrimination in places of public accommodation have not been
applied to the membership policies of private social clubs.", 4 In
addition, the legislative history of California's first public accom-
modation statute in 1897 showed no indication of intending to
apply to private social clubs, "and the decisions applying the statute
do not suggest that the legislation had any such effect.""'
Considering these facts, the court stated, "[a]lthough we con-
clude that the provisions of [the statute] do not apply to the
membership decisions of a truly private social club, we hasten to
add that an entity is not automatically exempt from the strictures
of [the statute] simply because it characterizes itself as a 'private
social club.' ,116 This is an important distinction since, theoretically,
virtually any establishment, no matter what its true purpose, could
claim to be a private club in order to escape the legal burden of
equal rights. Thus, the court's negation of this possibility was note-
worthy.
According to the California Supreme Court's decision in
Warfield, there were several factors that should be considered in
determining whether a club has private or public status. 87 These
factors were:
(1) the selectivity of the group in the admission of members,
(2) the size of the group, (3) the degree of membership con-
trol over the governance of the organization (and particularly
the selection of new members), (4) the degree to which club
facilities are available for use by nonmembers, and (5) whether
the primary purpose served by the club is social or business.
1 88
The plaintiff argued that applying these factors to the facts in
the case resulted in several favorable conclusions. First, the plain-
tiff argued that "the size of the total membership of the club (700
members plus their spouses and children)" was too substantial to
meet the standard of selectivity established by the court. 9 Next,
"the circumstances that only one-half of the members were pro-
prietary members with the authority to govern the club and select
183. Both the trial court and Court of Appeal held that the club was not a business es-
tablishment within the Unruh Act. 896 P.2d at 783.
184. Id. at 789.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 791.
187. Id. at 791-92.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 792.
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new members" demonstrated that the plaintiff's entrance into the
club would not have a significant effect on the governance of the
club itself.""' Third, "the access enjoyed by nonmembers to the
club's pro golf and tennis shops and to 'sponsored events"' was an
obvious indicator that the club was not exclusive to members.' 9
Finally, "the opportunity for obtaining advantageous business con-
tacts provided by club membership" was such an important aspect
of the plaintiff's relationship with the club that she argued that the
primary purpose could be deemed business rather than social.1
92
Interestingly, the court found that only one of these conclusions
was necessary to deem the club a business establishment. The court
ruled that:
[T]here is no need to determine whether defendant consti-
tutes a "private club" rather than a place of public
accommodation under the multi-pronged standard developed
in the out-of-state cases, because we conclude that the business
transactions that are conducted regularly in the club's premises with
persons who are not members of the club are sufficient in themselves
to bring the club within the reach of section 51's broad refer-
ence to "all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever."
9 3
Thus, the court ruled for the plaintiff, recognizing the underlying
purpose of California's Unruh Act.
9 4
2. Borne v. Haverhill Golf and Country Club-The most recent
court decision addressing country club discrimination is Borne v.
Haverhill Golf and Country Club."' In October, 1999 a unanimous jury
in Massachusetts Superior Court awarded $1.97 million to nine
women whom it determined had suffered gender discrimination at





194. Id. at 798.
195. No. 96-6511-C, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 523 (Nov. 19, 1999).
196. See Margaret Graham Tebo, Teed Off. Massachusetts Court Takes Shot at Private Country
Club for Gender Discrimination, A.B.A.J., Feb. 2000, at 26. $1.5 million of the award was in the
form of punitive damages. The plaintiffs' claims of sex discrimination were brought under
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 92A (2001) and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B. The plaintiffs also
successfully claimed that the club breached its implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing. Borne, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 523 at *1. Section 92 A states, in relevant part, that:
No owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any
place of public accommodation, resort or amusement shall ... discriminate against...
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transformed into a place of public accommodation subject to state
law because it rented out three function rooms to the public for
banquets and meetings. '9 7 These golfers successfully argued that the
suburban Boston club engaged in discrimination by offering them
only limited memberships;9 " limited members were denied tee
times on weekend mornings and during selected weekday blocks,
while primary members had no tee time restrictions." Only four of
the club's 320 primary members were women,2° as they were rou-
tinely steered into limited memberships and sometimes passed
over on the waiting list for available primary memberships by men
because of 'special circumstances.'
20 1
In addition, the plaintiffs established that the club discriminated
against them in its membership transfer policy. 2 2 Men and women
were subjected to different criteria when they sought to change the
persons of any religious sect, creed, class, race, color, denomination, sex, sexual ori-
entation ... or because of deafness or blindness, or any physical or mental disability,
in the full enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges of-
fered to the general public by such places of public accommodation, resort or
amusement.
A place of public accommodation, resort or amusement within the meaning hereof
shall be defined as and shall be deemed to include any place, whether licensed or
unlicensed, which is open to and accepts or solicits the patronage of the general pub-
lic and, without limiting the generality of this definition, whether or not it be (1) an
inn, tavern, hotel, shelter, roadhouse, motel, trailer camp or resort for transient or
permanent guests or patrons seeking housing or lodging, food, drink, entertainment,
health, recreation or rest; ... (3) a gas station, garage, retail store or establishment,
including those dispensing personal services; (4) a restaurant, bar or eating place,
where food, beverages, confections or their derivatives are sold for consumption on
or off the premises; (5) a rest room, barber shop, beauty parlor, bathhouse, seashore
facilities or swimming pool, except such rest room, bathhouse or seashore facility as
may be segregated on the basis of sex; ... (7) an auditorium, theatre, music hall,
meeting place or hall, including the common halls of buildings; (8) a place of public
amusement, recreation, sport, exercise or entertainment.
(emphasis added).
197. Borne, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 523 at 8.
198. See Tebo, supra note 196.
199. Borne, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS at 4. Primary members pay for this privilege, as
they are subjected to higher initiation fees, annual dues, and required monthly dining room
charges. Id. While the tee time restrictions based on club membership category were not per
se illegal, the club's golf pro allowed exceptions to the restrictions based exclusively on gen-
der. The golf pro frequently allowed limited and junior male members to tee off during the
restricted times but not limited and junior female members. Id.
200. Id. at 2.
201. Jimmy Golen, Judge May Appoint Monitor for Golf Course Discrimination, ASSOcIATE
PRESS SPORTS NEWS, Nov. 30, 1999 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
202. Borne, 1999 Mass Super LEXIS at 3-4.
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category of their memberships.203 Men did not have to pay an ini-
tiation fee when they upgraded from a junior, family, or limited
membership to a primary membership; women seeking to make a
similar change in status were subjected to such a fee.2 °4 Another
area in which the club discriminated against its female members
was in its facility usage policy.2 0 5 While women were granted access
to the club's '19th Hole' bar in 1990 per a court order stemming
from a complaint that they filed with the Massachusetts Commis-
sion Against Discrimination, they were discouraged from
entering and, thus, largely still denied access to the club's Card
207Room by club officials. Finally, the jury determined that the club
engaged in gender discrimination in its member tournaments20° by
excluding women holding primary memberships from its "Primary
209tournaments" without any legitimate reasons.
Pursuant to several post-trial motions, Judge John Cratsley of
Massachusetts Superior Court issued a permanent injunction bar-
ring Haverhill Golf and Country Club from "making any
distinction, restriction, or discrimination on the basis of sex in rela-
tion to any rights, benefits, services, and/or privileges at the
club., 2 0 The judge also ordered the club to provide gender dis-
crimination avoidance training to its board members and
management, keep records of its membership and waiting lists,
inform current and prospective members of their privileges, bene-
fits and rights, and provide him with reports of the application
process.2  While the judge refused the Massachusetts attorney gen-
eral's request to appoint a monitor with authority over club
operations, he agreed to hold "periodic compliance review hear-
ings" to ensure that the club adhered to the injunction. In
addition to this stringent judicial oversight, the court ordered the
club to pay the plaintiffs' attorney's fees in the amount of
203. Id.
204. Id. The initiation fee rose from $1000 to $4000 when women became eligible for
primary memberships in the early 1990's. SeeJ.M. Lawrence, A Year After Court Win, Female
Golfers Battle Discrimination On and Off Course in Haverhill, BOSTON HERALD, Nov. 28, 2000, at
47.
205. Borne, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS at 4.
206. Lynn Rosellini, 'Those Women' vs. the 'Neanderthals,' Gender Politics at a Massachusetts
Golf Club, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,June 12, 2000, at 56.
207. Borne, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS at 4-5.
208. Id. at 4.
209. Id.
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$486,000.213 The Appeals Court of Massachusetts affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.
14
3. Other State Legislation--Several states have enacted legislation
that specifically addresses discrimination in private country clubs.
Connecticut's comprehensive equal access law requires that any
private country club with at least twenty members and a nine-hole
golf course that either receives revenues from nonmembers or
holds a liquor license refrain from discrimination in its member-
ship or access policies.215 The law also mandates that private
213. Id.
214. Borne v. Haverhill Golf & Country Club, Inc., 58 Mass. App. Ct. 306 (2003). The
Supreme Court of Massachusetts refused to review the case. Borne v. Haverhill Golf & Coun-
try Club, Inc., 440 Mass. 1101 (2003).
215. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571d (2001) provides in relevant part:
a) For the purposes of this section, "golf country club" means an association of per-
sons consisting of not less than twenty members who pay membership fees or dues
and which maintains a golf course of not less than nine holes and (1) receives pay-
ment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages, directly or
indirectly, from or on behalf of nonmembers or (2) holds a permit to sell alcoholic
liquor...
(b) No golf country club may deny membership in such club to any person on ac-
count of race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status or sexual
orientation.
(c) All classes of membership in a golf country club shall be available without regard
to race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status or sexual orienta-
tion.
(d) A golf country club that allows the use of its facilities or services by two or more
adults per membership, including the use of such facilities or services during re-
stricted times, shall make such use equally available to all adults entitled to use such
facilities or services under that membership. The requirements of this subsection
concerning equal access to facilities or services of such club shall not apply to adult
children included in the membership. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed
to affect the assessment by a golf country club of any fees, dues or charges it deems
appropriate, including the ability to charge additional fees, dues or charges for access
by both adult members during restricted times.
(e) A golf country club that has food or beverage facilities or services shall allow
equal access to such facilities and services for all adults in all membership categories
at all times. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require access to such fa-
cilities or services by any person if such access by such person would violate any
provision of the general statutes or a municipal ordinance concerning the sale, con-
sumption or regulation of alcoholic beverages.
(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a golf country club from
sponsoring or permitting events that are limited to members of one sex if such club
sponsors or permits events that are comparable for members of each sex.
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country clubs allow all members equal access to all facilities. 216
similar law exists in the state of Michigan, where a private club
cannot discriminate against its members by refusing to grant them
access to any of the club's facilities 17 In addition, the state's Civil
Rights Act specifically includes private country clubs within the
definition of a place of public accommodation. In NewJersey, an
amendment to NewJersey's 'Law Against Discrimination' prohibits
a private club from discriminating against any of its members.2 19
Since a club cannot deprive any member of any privilege, restric-
tions on tee-times and access to club facilities are not allowed. The
law's limited scope has been effective in ending gender discrimina-
tion against existing country club members. 220 However, the law
does not address discrimination against nonmembers; private
country clubs are otherwise exempt from the state's antidiscrimina-
tion law.
221
While not enacting laws that specifically address discrimination
in private country clubs, other states have taken steps to ensure
that these clubs are included in the definition of 'public accom-
modation' in their respective antidiscrimination laws. In Kansas,
private clubs that have over 100 members, provide regular meal
service, and receive payments from nonmembers are included
within the definition of public accommodations. 22 Clubs in Florida
are subject to that state's antidiscrimination laws if they have over
400 members.2 2
(g) Any person aggrieved by a violation of the provisions of this section may bring a
civil action in the Superior Court to enjoin further violations and to recover the ac-
tual damages sustained by reason of such violation or two hundred fifty dollars,
whichever is greater, together with costs and a reasonable attorney's fee.
(h) If, in an action brought under subsection (g) of this section, the court finds that
a golf country club holding a permit to sell alcoholic liquor ... has violated any of
the provisions of this section, it may, in addition to any relief ordered under said sub-
section (g), order the suspension of such permit until such time as it determines that
such club is no longer in violation of this section.
216. Id.
217. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 37.2302(a) (2001).
218. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 37.2301(a) (i) (2001).
219. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (f)(2) (2001).
220. See Goodwin, supra note 172.
221. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (1) (2001).
222. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1002 (i) (2000).
223. FLA. STAT. § 760.60 (1) (2000).
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C. Application of Case Law
Pursuant to a discussion of the relevant legal issues involved in
country club discrimination, it is necessary to determine how the
respective parties would present their arguments. This section will
analyze the arguments likely to be proffered by each side.
1. Plaintiff's Arguments-In the absence of legislation that
transforms an otherwise private country club into a public accom-
modation subject to antidiscrimination laws, a plaintiff must
establish that state action exists before a court will intervene. The
Supreme Court has been generally reluctant to adopt a broad view
of state action that would infringe on the rights of private groups.224
Therefore, once a club is deemed private, it becomes very difficult
for a country club discrimination case to make it past the threshold
issue of state action.
A plaintiffs first goal should therefore be to prove that the club
is a place of public accommodation. While a plaintiff may assert
that a private club is a public accommodation under Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,25 this goal could be better achieved in sev-
eral ways. First, a plaintiff may emphasize that a club allows its
facilities to be used by nonmembers. The occurrence of commer-
cial activity such as open tournaments, weddings, bar mitzvahs, and
business meetings at a private club may be a key factor in trans-
forming it into a public accommodation.226 Second, a plaintiff may
argue that a club is not genuinely selective in its admission policy.
Factors such as the number of club members, the amount of the
membership fee, the admissions criteria and standards, and the
formality of admissions procedures may be dispositive in finding
that a club is a public accommodation. 22' Finally, a plaintiff may
assert that a club that advertises for new members is not distinctly
private.
A plaintiff who is able to pass this threshold may then attempt to
prove that discrimination is actually occurring.22 There are several
224. SeeMoose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-79 (1972).
225. SeeDaniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
226. Such evidence was heavily relied upon by the courts in both Haverhill and Warfield.
See infra section lV.B.2.
227. SeeJolly-Ryan, supra note 3, at 510-11.
228. Id. at 514. For example, Haworth Country Club is a private country club in north-
ern NewJersey that offered membership in a New York Times advertisement in March 2002.
Therefore, it is not distinctly private despite the $60,000 full membership fee. See Advertise-
ment, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 10, 2002, at Sec. 14-9.
229. See Shropshire, supra note 23, at 641-42.
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policy areas of a country club that may be involved in discrimina-
tion cases. First, the membership policies of clubs may come under
scrutiny if they either imply or openly state that a member of a pro-
tected class may not apply or be accepted for membership. 230 The
types of memberships granted may also be at issue, since limited or
partial memberships may be attainable by a member of a protected
class, while full memberships may not be. Litigation may also arise
as a result of unequal facilities or considerations for protected
classes who are already members of the country club. 23 ' For exam-
ple, a group of women may seek judicial relief as a result of
inadequate locker room facilities when compared to those of their
male counterparts. The opportunity to partake in events on the
grounds of a country club is another area where discrimination
may occur. Prime tee-times or tennis court spaces may, for exam-
ple, be reserved for men, making it impossible for women to enjoy
the full range of benefits offered by a club. If the plaintiff was able
to establish that discrimination was occurring at the club, the court
would then turn to an analysis of the freedom of association.
The constitutional right to freedom of association would likely
be raised as a defense by a country club. First, a club could attempt
to establish that an intimate association exists. If it were able to do
so, a plaintiff would be unlikely to be able to successfully argue that
a state may interfere with the actions of a club. 2 However, a plain-
tiff could attempt to prove that the relationships established as a
result of membership are based more on business than a personal
level. If a plaintiff demonstrated that people joined the club with
the express purpose of establishing business relationships, the
court may be convinced that the discrimination can be ameliorated
without infringing on any intimate association.233 A plaintiff would
undoubtedly face great difficulty in successfully proffering this ar-
gument.
The issue of expressive association is equally important in the
analysis. 34 if a country club asserts an expressive association right, a
plaintiff must rebut this argument and demonstrate that the club
members do not have such an association. The basic premise of an
expressive association argument is that the challenged group was
formed with the purpose of unifying members who hold a common
230. For example, the country club might prohibit women or racial minorities from be-
coming members.
231. See Kamp, supra note 4, at 90-91.
232. See id. at 96-97.




belief.235 For example, members of a group that meets to discuss the
issue of abortion exhibit an expressive association. It should be
easier for a plaintiff in a country club case to disprove the existence
of an expressive association since membership in a country club is
not typically based on a belief or a set of beliefs. Country club
membership is instead usually the result of a desire for recreational
facilities, social interaction, or business opportunities. A plaintiff
could argue that any of these are a primary reason that individuals
join a club, and that ending the challenged discrimination would
not infringe on any expressive rights.
2. Defendant's Arguments-A country club has numerous options
available to it in defending itself against a discrimination lawsuit.
As previously noted, a club might first address state action by argu-
ing that a narrow interpretation of both state action and public
accommodation is appropriate given the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Moose Lodge and Dale.236 The defendant club could assert
that it is does not allow significant use of the facilities by nonmem-
bers of the club, has a genuinely selective admissions policy, and
does not advertise for new members.
If a club loses on these points, its strategy would likely be to re-
fute the allegations of discrimination. First, a club could point to
its bylaws, which would typically not include any discriminatory
231policies, as proof that it does not discriminate. It could also assert
that any exclusion of protected classes from membership results
from a lack of interest and applications for membership, rather
than a denial of membership applications. The club may also
choose to demonstrate that financial status is the determining fac-
tor that limits membership. The club could assert that they would
accept members of all races and genders if they could pay the
membership fees. Again, the club could attempt to demonstrate
that the lack of diversity in its membership was coincidental rather
than based on any stated policy. As a matter of practice, many new
members of country clubs are accepted after an existing member
gives them a recommendation .2 3 8 This virtually assures that minori-
ties or women cannot become members in many clubs unless they
are personally acquainted with current members. This is unlikely
235. See id. at 517.
236. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175-76 (1972), Boy Scouts of Amer-
ica v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
237. It is far more likely that these policies are unwritten. See Kamp, supra note 4, at 90-
91.
238. SeeJolly-Ryan, supra note 3, at 495.
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to occur if the existing members of a country club routinely dis-
criminate.
If a private club is unsuccessful in putting forth these arguments
and must instead justify its discrimination, its first option would be
to establish the existence of an intimate association. This issue
hinges on the type of relationships that club members enjoy with
each other as a result of their club membership. 9 It is easy for a
club to demonstrate that the primary stated purpose of the group
is to engage in social activity.240 The fact that there are business or
political goals associated with membership is implied. While these
benefits may nonetheless exist, the fact that the primary purpose of
club membership seems to be social-in that many long-term per-
sonal relationships are formed as a result of membership-would
provide a country club with a strong argument that an intimate
association exists.
The second option for a club would be to claim that it enjoys an
expressive association right. A club opting for this claim would at-
tempt to prove that its members hold a common belief (or set of
beliefs) on which their membership is based.2 4' For example, if all
of the members of a country club were the same religion, it may be
able to prove the existence of an expressive association. However,
this would be more difficult for a club to prove than would an in-
timate association, and it would seem highly unlikely that a club
could make this assertion.
V. POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
A. New Federal or State Legislation
Clearly, the ultimate solution to country club discrimination
would be to enact legislation at the federal level that would specifi-
cally forbid country clubs from discriminating. Though the
likelihood of this legislation being passed is slim, there seems to be
an important difference between the Boy Scouts of America and
the typical private country club that could be a key factor in de-
termining if such legislation could withstand legal challenge.
There appears to be a general sentiment in contemporary Ameri-
can society that while social organizations must be given the
freedom to act according to their beliefs independent from state
239. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-21.
240. SeeJolly-Ryan, supra note 3, at 495.
241. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622-23.
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intervention, when these beliefs manifest themselves in a business
setting any discrimination that they cause is sufficiently offensive to
warrant legislative action.
With this in mind, the business climate present at most country
clubs makes these organizations vastly different from truly social
organizations such as the Boy Scouts. Unfortunately, this fact could
both help and hinder the process of eradicating country club dis-
crimination. On one hand, the fact that the associational freedoms
in country clubs are suspect, coupled with the fact that business
transactions come under their own forms of constitutional scrutiny,
could allow Congress to take bold initiatives aimed at equaling the
playing field. Broad federal legislation modeled after one of the
aforementioned state public accommodations laws could certainly
have this effect. The removal of the private club exemption from
the Civil Rights Act could have a similar effect. In lieu of federal
legislation, states could adopt public accommodations laws pat-
terned after California's Unruh Act or the New York City Human
Rights Law that would provide them with an effective tool in eradi-
cating country club discrimination. State courts that have evaluated
the application of the public accommodations laws to private coun-
try clubs have consistently held that the clubs are subject to these
242laws. State courts champion equality at the expense of liberty.
Practically, however, new federal or state legislation is highly
unlikely for two reasons. First, many federal and state legislators
are members of country clubs. As such, they enjoy the amenities
and privileges of club membership and benefit immensely from
this affiliation.244 Enacting measures that would abbreviate these
benefits would be contrary to their self-interest. Second, many of
the key financial contributors to the political campaigns of federal
and state legislators are wealthy individuals who may also be mem-
bers of country clubs who are unlikely to favor an individual who
acts directly against their interests. Disturbing the traditional set-
tings of country clubs could financially burden those legislators
who champion the call for equality. The importance of country
clubs in business and in politics may make it imperative that legis-
lators ensure that these clubs be able to operate completely free
242. See Moss, supra note 15, at 255.
243. See Eric Yoder, Golfing Large in the Beltway, GOLFWEB, June 4, 1997, available at
http://services.golfweb.com/ga97/pga/0602/features/beltwaygolf.html (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
244. Interestingly, New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg resigned his membership
in several prestigious clubs during his candidacy in order to avoid criticism during the may-
oral race from the minority groups that are largely excluded from these clubs.
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from the governmental interference that would arise out of any
'club-unfriendly' legislation. It would likely be political suicide for
a legislator to support any such measures. This is a risk that few
legislators are likely to take.
In general, it is unlikely that any legislation specific to country
clubs that would be effective in curtailing discrimination in this
setting will be enacted in the near future. While litigation and ex-
isting federal and state legislation may ultimately lead to the
eradication of discrimination in private country clubs, it is also
necessary to consider alternative methods of achieving this result
since economic and political concerns suggest that any such legis-
lation is improbable. In the absence of legislation, attention might
shift to various 'back door' alternatives that involve the curtailment
of the many government benefits and privileges afforded country
clubs in order to have a direct financial impact on their operations.
These economic solutions are discussed in the sections that follow.
B. Removal of Liquor Licenses
The primary reason that many individuals claim to be members
of country clubs is to socialize with their friends. The country club
often plays a very important role in the social life of its members,
and this socializing typically involves the consumption of alcoholic
beverages at the club's bar (frequently referred to as the '19th
Hole') and dining facilities.245 One member of a prestigious coun-
try club in New Jersey recently commented that "[N] obody would
come to the club if it didn't serve alcohol. Forget it. '246 This is likely
a common sentiment that could provide a useful method of eradi-
cating country club discrimination.
The simple existence of a liquor license granted by the state is
24not enough to establish state action. However, under the powers
granted to the states to regulate the use of liquor by the Twenty-
First Amendment, 248 a state may consider the existence of a dis-
245. See Goodwin, supra note 172.
246. Interview with anonymous individual (June 26, 2001) (at the individual's request,
the identity of the individual and club shall remain anonymous).
247. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175-76 (1972).
248. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI provides:
Sec. 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United
States is hereby repealed.
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criminatory policy when issuing and renewing liquor licenses.49
Numerous states, including Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Michigan,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Utah, require hold-
ers of liquor licenses to refrain from discriminating against women
and minorities;25 ° these states will confiscate the liquor licenses of
clubs engaging in such discrimination.2
This is a stiff social and financial penalty and is potentially an ex-
tremely useful tactic in ending discrimination at country clubs.
Members of a country club that discriminates would be forced ei-
ther to end the discriminatory practices or refrain from consuming
alcohol at the club. At a club that chooses the latter option, it is
Sec. 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or posses-
sion of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
Sec. 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an
amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as
provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the
submission hereof to the States by the Congress.
249. See BPOE Lodge No. 2043 v. Ingraham, 297 A.2d 607, 608-16, 619-20 (Me. 1972)
(holding that a state statute prohibiting private clubs from using race as a membership crite-
ria allowed the Maine Liquor Commission to legally refuse to renew the liquor licenses of
fifteen Elks Lodges); see also Vaspourakan, Ltd. v. Mass. Alcoholic Beverages Control
Comm'n, 516 N.E.2d 1153, 1154-55 (Mass. 1987) (holding that the state's antidiscrimina-
tion statute permitted a night club's liquor license to be revoked after it denied African
Americans entrance); Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge No. 1743, BPOE, 854 P.2d 513, 514-
19 (Utah 1993) (holding that the sale of alcoholic beverages by an Elks Lodge made it sub-
ject to the antidiscrimination provisions of the Utah Civil Rights Act, as it qualified it as an
"enterprise regulated by the state"); Coalition For Open Doors v. Annapolis Lodge No. 622,
BPOE, 635 A.2d 412, 413 (Md. 1994) (holding that city may condition the grant or renewal
of a liquor license on proof that a private club does not discriminate in its membership
policies on the basis of race, gender, religion, physical handicap, or national origin). See also
Jolly-Ryan, supra note 3, at 519-20.
250. See Elks Lodges Nos. 719 & 2021 v. Utah Department of Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol, 905 P.2d 1189, 1200 (Utah 1995); see also 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-17 (West
1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1301-A (West Supp. 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 32A-5-
102(3) (a), -102(3) (b), -103(7), -105(2) (c) (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571d (West Supp.
2003).
251. The Connecticut statute allows courts to revoke the liquor licenses of country clubs
that discriminate on the basis of gender, race, religion, national origin, marital status, or
sexual orientation. The New Jersey statute allows the state to withhold liquor licenses from
private clubs that hold public functions (such as weddings) and engage in gender discrimi-
nation. In New Hampshire, there are clear standards that must be met before an
establishment can receive a liquor license. 13 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 178:4 (2002). Liquor
licenses must be renewed each year, and there is a provision which states, "the vendor's li-
cense shall expire annually on the last day of the month of the incorporation or other
organization of the liquor company and shall be renewed annually by the commission, upon
application, unless the commission finds, after notice and hearing, that the renewal of such
license would be against the public interest." Id. This consideration could include an analy-
sis of membership or other policies that are deemed discriminatory.
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highly unlikely that the members would become teetotalers; they
would likely seek out alternative places to imbibe. This would im-
pose a severe financial burden on the club, as it would lose a
significant amount of revenues from both the sale of alcoholic bev-
erages and the corresponding decrease in the club's restaurant
business, as many members would likely choose to patronize an
establishment where they could drink alcohol with their meals.
This loss of revenues would have to be recouped from another area
of the club's operations and may lead to higher dues or initiation
fees for the club's membership.
The increased prices could ultimately have a chilling effect on
membership, as individuals may be resistant to such higher costs.
In addition, the social costs associated with the loss of a liquor li-
cense are not insignificant. As previously mentioned, socializing
with friends and associates is for many individuals the greatest
benefit of club membership. As alcohol consumption is part of this
social milieu, the loss of this privilege is significant; club members
would likely spend less time at the country club as they sought to
socialize in a more desirable, 'user-friendly' setting. As the club be-
came less important in the social lives of its members, membership
would lose its cachet-and its value.
C. Removal of Tax Exempt Status
As non-profit organizations, private country clubs are exempted
from federal and state income tax liability."2 This provides a tre-
mendous financial beneft to country clubs at taxpayers' expense.253
Thus, the government implicitly subsidizes discrimination at many
country clubs; the exemption from federal taxes applies even if a
club discriminates, provided that the invidious policy is unwrit-
254ten.
252. Section 501 (a) of the tax code states, "An organization described in subsection (c)
or (d) or section 401 (a) shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle unless such ex-
emption is denied under section 502 or 503." I.R.C. § 501 (a) (1999). The country club
exemption is found in 501 (c) (7) which states, "Clubs organized for pleasure, recreation,
and other nonprofitable purposes, substantially all of the activities of which are for such
purposes and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private share-
holder." I.R.C. § 501 (c) (7) (1999).
253. Every year in Texas, private recreational clubs save an estimated $1.1 million by not
paying state franchise taxes; several clubs in Dallas save approximately $1.7 million each in
federal income taxes every year because of the exemption. Tracy Everbach & Mark Wrolstad,
Most Elite Country Clubs Haven't Admitted Blacks, DALLAS MoRING NEWS, May 22, 1997, at IA.
254. See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 457-58 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that
the granting of a tax exemption to Elks Lodge with racially discriminatory admissions policy
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While the tax code includes a provision that forces social clubs
to adhere to a practice of nondiscrimination, the requirement has
little practical effect. Internal Revenue Code section 501 (i) states:
Notwithstanding subsection (a), an organization which is
described in subsection (c) (7) shall not be exempt from taxa-
tion under subsection (a) for any taxable year if, at any time
during such taxable year, the charter, bylaws, or other govern-
ing instrument, of such organization ... contains a provision
which provides for discrimination against any person on the
255basis of race, color, or religion.
The obvious problem with this statement is the fact that is highly
unlikely that a country club that discriminates puts its policy in
256 slwriting. One solution to this problem would be to amend the
provision to account for obvious discrimination that is unwritten
but occurs nonetheless. Though members of country clubs often
claim that the disparity in membership amongst minorities and
women is a result of socioeconomic considerations rather than any
outward discrimination, country club discrimination potentially
could be proven by a statistical analysis of membership figures simi-
lar to the method approved in an employment context by the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.2 "57 There, the Court de-
termined that the plaintiff need not prove intent on the part of the
defendant, but must only prove a disproportionate impact on a
258protected group.
If a court were to apply a similar method of statistical analysis in
a non-employment context and the analysis showed that discrimi-
nation was taking place, the tax-exempt status of the country club
in question could be attacked on this basis. However, it is unlikely
that a court would apply this standard in a non-employment con-
text. Members of a country club that is forced to pay federal
is constitutional and is not equivalent to a government involvement in or approval of racial
discrimination).
255. I.R.C. § 501(i) (1999).
256. While doing so would clearly establish the existence of the club's discriminatory
policy and lead to a loss of its exemption from federal taxes, it would not necessarily make it
easier for members of protected classes to ultimately prevail in court. In Dale, the Supreme
Court stated that had the Boy Scouts put its policy of denouncing homosexuality in writing,
the group may have been able to avoid having to prove that they were sincere in this belief
and thus were justified in enforcing it under their freedom of expressive association. 120 S.
Ct. 2446 (2000).
257. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
258. Id. at 428-29.
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income taxes on its revenues would face a dramatic increase in
their assessments, dues and/or initiation fees in order for the club
to be able pay for its tax liability. This is a significant financial bur-
den that could be substantial enough to force the club to end its
discriminatory practices. Attacking the substantial tax advantages
that country clubs enjoy would make for sensible and fair tax pol-
icy. A country club should not enjoy the benefits of favorable tax
rules if it discriminates against minorities, and taxpayers should
not be forced to subsidize entities that engage in behavior that
many find odious.
Another aspect of federal tax policy that is dubious with respect
to country clubs involves allowable business entertainment deduc-
tions. While individuals are no longer allowed to deduct
259membership dues or initiation fees as business expenses, they are
allowed to deduct 50 percent of expenses directly related to or as-sociaed wth • 260
sociated with business. Allowable expenses include those
involving entertainment and meals at any club whatsoever-
including country clubs that discriminate. 6 ' Through the business
entertainment deductions, taxpayers are again subsidizing business
activity occurring at private clubs that discriminate. The deduction
should be disallowed if the expenses are incurred at a country club
that engages in discrimination.
The state of California's tax code provides a useful model for
possible changes to the Internal Revenue Code. In California, no
deduction is allowed for "expenditures made at, or payments made
to, a club which restricts membership or the use of its services or
facilities on the basis of age, sex, race, religion, color, ancestry, or
national origin."212 Though appealingly straightforward, Califor-
nia's policy is not practical to administer. Implementation of this
restriction would be difficult for two reasons. First, it is unclear who
would ultimately bear the responsibility of establishing that a par-
ticular country club engages in discrimination. Courts and
agencies at both the federal and state levels could potentially make
such a determination; it is foreseeable that difficulties could arise
surrounding the overlapping jurisdiction of the various entities.
A second issue involves the administrative difficulty of disallow-.
ing the deductions by members of a country club pursuant to a
determination that their club engages in discriminatory practices.
259. "No deduction shall be allowed under this chapter for amounts paid or incurred
for membership in any club organized for business, pleasure, recreation, or other social
purpose." I.R.C. § 274(a) (3) (1999).
260. SeeI.R.C. § 274(n) (1999).
261. See id.
262. Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 24343.2(a) (West 2000).
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Every member of the club, their guests, and any outside groups
that used the club's facilities for business purposes would need to
be audited in order to determine whether improper deductions
were taken. This is an extremely overwhelming task that places un-
163realistic demands on government agencies.
D. Removal of Property Tax Exemptions
Property taxes are another area where country clubs are vulner-
able. Country clubs typically have expansive facilities, both indoors
and outside on their property. Clubs may also have a substantial
amount of land under their control, particularly if a golf course is
part of the facility. If their land were properly assessed, country
clubs would incur steep property taxes. However, many country
clubs that operate golf courses have been afforded generous
abatements under state 'open spaces' laws. These laws provide tax
incentives to country clubs to maintain their land as open spaces by
extending them favorable land appraisals and commensurately
lower property taxes.2 6 The maintenance of land for recreational
and environmental purposes may be a legitimate goal; however, in
cases of country clubs that practice discrimination, these allow-
ances should be revoked.
Some states require that country clubs refrain from discrimina-
tion in order to qualify for property tax exemptions.265 This
263. One commentator has estimated that an audit of a single taxpayer could take one
year. SeeJolly-Ryan, supra note 3, at 524.
264. Typical of these laws, the Minnesota Open Space Property Tax Law has the follow-
ing purpose:
The present general system of ad valorem property taxation in the state of Minnesota
does not provide an equitable basis for the taxation of certain private outdoor recrea-
tional, open space and park land property and has resulted in excessive taxes on
some of these lands. Therefore, it is hereby declared that the public policy of this
state would be best served by equalizing tax burdens upon private outdoor, recrea-
tional, open space and park land within this state through appropriate taxing
measures to encourage private development of these lands which would otherwise
not occur or have to be provided by governmental authority.
MINN. STAT. § 273.112.2 (2000).
265. In Minnesota, private country clubs with fifty or more members and more than five
acres of property are denied property tax deferments if they discriminate in membership
requirements or selection, or limit access to golf, beverage, or dining facilities on the basis
of sex or marital status. See MINN. STAT. § 273.112.3 (2000). In order to qualify for the de-
ferments every year, these clubs must make an affirmative showing that they do not
discriminate in their bylaw, rules, and regulations. See MINN. STAT. § 273.112.6 (2000). A
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requirement is valid under the U.S. constitution. 66 Implementing a
policy that grants preferential treatment to only those country
clubs that do not discriminate could coerce those clubs that en-
gage in bigotry, segregation, and intolerance to reconsider their
practices in order to avoid the severe financial burden that would
result were the club ineligible for a property tax abatement.
E. Sanctions by Professional Athletes, Tours and Governing Bodies
Like the country clubs at which their tournaments are held, the
governing bodies of golf in the United States have a long history of
discrimination. From 1943 to 1961, the Professional Golfers' Asso-
ciation of America (PGA) banned African-Americans from
membership.1 17 The "Caucasians-only" clause was codified in the
PGA's constitution and bylaws: "Professional golfers of the Cauca-
sian race, over the age of eighteen years, residing in North or
South America, and have served at least five years in the profession
... shall be eligible for membership. ",268 In the early 1950's African-
American professional golfers Teddy Rhodes and Bill Spiller sued
the PGA Tour under the California public accommodations law
when they were denied entry into the Richmond Open, a PGA
Tour event in northern California.2 6 9 The lawsuit was dismissed af-
ter the PGA promised not to discriminate against anyone because
of color.27°
This promise has long been ignored.2 ' After the PGA received
negative publicity when professional boxer (and nascent golfer)
failure to do results in a club being assessed as if it were regular property. See id. § 273.112.4
(2000). See also Maryland Tax-Property Code Ann. § 8-214 (2001) (denying tax abatement to
country clubs that discriminate on the basis of race, color, creed, sex, or national origin in
membership or guest privileges). The Maryland Department of Assessment and Taxation's
Real Estate Division recently began the process of assessing and reassessing the value of
every golf course in the state. See Maryland Golf and Country Clubs-Tax Alert, available at
http://www.natlclub.org/maryland.htm (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
266. See State of Md. v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315 Md. 254 (1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 816 (1989) (prohibition of gender discrimination at country clubs with open spaces
contract does not infringe on members' First Amendment rights).
267. See KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 20-21.
268. Id. (summarizing former Section 1, Article III of PGA Const. & Bylaws). Though
the United States Golf Association (USGA) never adopted a similar clause, it followed the
unwritten segregative rules of its member clubs. Id. at 100.
269. Id. at 52-55.
270. Id. at 62.
271. Id. at 64.
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Joe Louis was banned from playing in a Tour event in 1952,272 it
changed some of its policies and allowed African-Americans to play
if the tournament's sponsors and host club acquiesced. 2 However,
they were still not allowed in the host club's locker rooms and
clubhouses274 and did not play in tournaments held in the South, as
the PGA's fear of a negative reaction from its Southern sponsors
and fan base prevented it from changing its policy. 2v5 This resulted
in African-Americans playing in only 10-15 of the Tour's 40 events
every year from 1952 to 1961.276 Though Charlie Sifford became
the first African-American golfer to play in a PGA Tour event in the
South in 1960277 the PGA refused to remove its "Caucasians-only"
clause in 1961 despite threats by the California Attorney General
that he would disrupt the 1962 PGA Championship to be held in
the state. 78 Instead of changing its discriminatory rule, the PGA
moved its 1962 championship to Aronimink Country Club in
Pennsylvania.279 The PGA finally removed the Caucasians-only
clause in November, 1961.8 °
Despite Lee Elder becoming the first African-American to com-
pete in the Masters tournament in 1975281 and Calvin Peete
winning more tournaments from 1982-85 than any other PGA
player,282 the barriers to African-American golfers remained, but
were largely ignored by the popular press until a much-publicized
interview in 1990. Hall Thompson, the president and co-founder
of the Shoal Creek Golf and Country Club in Birmingham, Ala-
bama did not mince words when questioned about the club's
racially discriminatory admissions policy weeks before the club
hosted the 1990 PGA Championship. Thompson stated, "The
country club is our home and we pick and choose who we want...
I think we've said we don't discriminate in every other area except
for the blacks. 283 In response to a question about whether mem-
bers brought African-Americans to the club as guests, Thompson
272. The PGA ultimately relented and allowed Louis to play in the tournament after he
stated, "I want people to know what the PGA is .... We've got another Hitler to get by." Id.
at 72-73.
273. Id. at 83.
274. Id. at 85.
275. Id. at 87-88.
276. Id. at 89.
277. Id. at 130. The event was the Greater Greensboro Open. Id.
278. Id. at 133-37.
279. Id. at 136.
280. Id. at 139.
281. Id. at 221.
282. Id. at 245-46.
283. Id. at 249.
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remarked, "[T]hat's just not done in Birmingham. ,2 s4 The subse-
quent controversy included threats of economic boycott by civil
rights leaders that resulted in several tournament sponsors with-
drawing from the event, the free admission of Louis Willie, an
African-American businessman from Birmingham, as an honorary
member of Shoal Creek Golf and Country Club days before the
tournament began, and Thompson's resignation as club presi-
dent.
2 5
Following the Shoal Creek controversy, the USGA, PGA of Amer-
ica, PGA Tour and Ladies Professional Golf Association (LPGA)
Tour revised their tournament site selection policies to require that
country clubs hosting events demonstrate that they are demonstra-
286,bly open to minorities. While prestigious country clubs such as
Augusta National, Crooked Stick, and Baltusrol admitted their first
minority members shortly thereafter, numerous others decided
to forsake the opportunity to host future events rather than amend
their admissions policies. 8 In addition, the tours and governing
bodies established The First Tee, a program developed to increase
racial and ethnic youth participation rates among underserved
284. SeeJohn Davis, Woods Still the Exception, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 24, 2000, at C9.
285. Id.
286. Id. Issued in 1991, the LPGA's policy statement concerning discrimination reads:
"The LPGA reiterates its opposition to discrimination in any form. The LPGA will require of
all sponsors with whom it contracts to hold a tournament that such tournaments be held
only at golf courses which do not and will not discriminate in their membership policies on
the basis of race, religion, gender or national origin. To this end, the LPGA, when contract-
ing with a sponsor, will require that the sponsor agree and confirm in writing that it will not
contract to hold a tournament at any golf course or club unless such golf course or club
agrees in writing that it does not and will not discriminate in its membership policies, either
directly or indirectly, on the basis of race, religion, gender or national origin, and that the
sponsor will extend its best efforts to determine and ensure that such statement, when given
to it by a contracting golf course or club, reflects the actual policy and practices of said golf
course or club." Presentation by Libba Galloway, Senior Vice President and Chief Legal
Officer, LPGA, to the Sport Lawyers Association Annual Conference (May 18, 2001) (on file
with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
287. Id.
288. See Shropshire, supra note 23, at 635. The dissident clubs and tournaments in-
cluded: Butler National (Western Open), Cypress Point Golf Club (AT&T Pebble Beach Pro-
An), Old Warson Country Club (Southwestern Bell Senior Classic), Skokie Country Club
(Ameritech Senior Open), Amarillo Country Club (Ben Hogan Amarillo Open), The Golf
Club of Louisiana (Ben Hogan Baton Rouge Open), St. Louis Country Club (1992 U.S.
Women's Amateur), Chicago Golf Club (1993 Walker Cup), Annandale Golf Club (1993
U.S. Women's Amateur), Merion Golf Club (1994 U.S. Women's Open), and Aronimink
Golf Club (1993 PGA Championship). SeeJaime Diaz, In Golf Integration is More Than 9-Iron
Away, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1991, at Cl.
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populations.2 9  Finally, the USGA appointed its first African-
American executive board member in 1992.290
Despite these measures, in many ways the tours and governing
bodies remain as reticent today as they were forty years ago when
they adhered to the "Caucasians-only" clause. One commentator
has referred to the PGA and LPGA Tours' nondiscrimination pol-
icy as "tokenism at its worst."29' The adoption of these policies may
have eased public pressure on the professional golf tours, but it has
had little effect on the membership policies of the country clubs
that host their events.2 2 Race and gender-based discrimination at
these elite clubs is still a rule rather than an exception, and the
professional tours and governing bodies seem to disregard their
edict when making tournament site selections. Although the 2002
U.S. ('People's') Open golf tournament was the first to be played
on a truly public course, the Masters tournament is still played at
Augusta National Golf Club, a prestigious club that has never had
any female members and has five African-Americans among its ap-
proximately 300 members.2 93 Augusta National chairman Hootie
Johnson defiantly responded to a letter from the National Council
of Women's Organizations urging the club to admit female mem-
bers. 94 Similarly, only two of the 1,300 members of The Country
289. See Davis, supra note 284. These bodies earmarked over $10 million for this pro-
gram from 1998-2000. Id.
290. See KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 249.
291. See Moss, supra note 15, at 163.
292. See Shropshire, supra note 23, at 634-35.
293. See Black Athlete Sports Network, African American With A Problem, available at
http://www.blackathlete.net/Blackbox/blackboxlll402.html (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
294. Johnson's response stated:
We have been contacted by Martha Burk, Chair of the National Council of Women's
Organizations (NCWO), and strongly urged to radically change our membership. Dr.
Burk said this change should take place before the Masters Tournament next spring
in order to avoid it becoming 'an issue.' She suggested that NCWO's leadership 'dis-
cuss this matter' with us.
We want the American public to be aware of this action right from the beginning. We
have advised Dr. Burk that we do not intend to participate in such backroom discus-
sions.
We take our membership very seriously. It is the very fabric of our club. Our members
are people who enjoy each other's company and the game of golf. Our membership
alone decides our membership-not any outside group with its own agenda.
We are not unmindful of the good work undertaken by Dr. Burk's organization in
global human rights, Social Security reform, reproductive health, education, spousal
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abuse and workplace equality, among others. We are therefore puzzled as to why they
have targeted our private golf club.
Dr. Burk's letter incorporates a deadline tied to the Masters and refers to sponsors of
the tournament's telecast. These references make it abundantly clear that Augusta
National Golf Club is being threatened with a public campaign designed to use eco-
nomic pressure to a achieve a goal of NCWO.
Augusta National and the Masters-while happily entwined-are quite different. One
is a private club. The other is a world-class sports event of great public interest. It is
insidious to attempt to use one to alter the essence of the other. The essence of a pri-
vate club is privacy.
Nevertheless, the threatening tone of Dr. Burk's letter signals the probability of a full-
scale effort to force Augusta National to yield to NCWO's will.
We expect such a campaign would attempt to depict the members of our club as in-
sensitive bigots and coerce the sponsors of the Masters to disassociate themselves
under threat-real or implied-of boycotts and other economic pressures.
We might see 'celebrity' interviews and talk show guests discussing the 'morality' of
private clubs. We could also anticipate op-ed articles and editorials.
There could be attempts at direct contact with board members of sponsoring corpo-
rations and inflammatory mailings to stockholders and investment institutions. We
might see everything from picketing and boycotts to t-shirts and bumper stickers. On
the internet, there could be active chat rooms and email messaging. These are all
elements of such campaigns.
We certainly hope none of that happens. However, the message delivered to us was
clearly coercive.
We will not be bullied, threatened or intimidated.
Obviously, Dr. Burk and her colleagues view themselves as agents of change and feel
any organization that has stood the test of time and has strong roots in tradition-
and does not fit their profile-needs to be changed.
We do not intend to become a trophy in their display case.
There may well come a day when women will be invited to join our membership but
that timetable will be ours and not at the point of a bayonet.
We do not intend to be further distracted by this matter. We will not make additional
comments or respond to the taunts and gripes artificially generated by the corporate
campaign.
We shall continue our traditions and prepare Augusta National Golf Club to host the
Masters as we have since 1934.
With all due respect, we hope Dr. Burk and her colleagues recognize the sanctity of
our privacy and continue their good work in a more appropriate arena.
Statement of Hootie Johnson, July 9, 2002, available at http://www.womensorganizations.org/
news/position04_press.htm (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
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Club in Brookline, Massachusetts are African-American ,' yet the
club hosted the 1999 Ryder Cup and was awarded the 2005 PGA
Championship, which the club subsequently relinquished because
it could not accommodate the size of the event."" The professional
golf tours could potentially help eradicate discrimination at the
country clubs that host their events by making their membership
requirements more rigorous and then imposing harsh sanctions on
clubs that refuse to comply. While the removal (or threat thereof)
of a tournament from a club engaging in discrimination is cer-
tainly a drastic action, the risk of negative publicity and the
potential for financial loss could force a club to truly change its
policy rather than add one or two minorities as a symbolic gesture
meant merely to placate its critics.
However, it is unlikely that the professional golf tours and gov-
erning bodies will adopt such measures. The PGA Tour refused the
National Council of Women's Organizations' (NCWO) request to
discontinue its recognition of the Masters as an official event and
to no longer count players' Masters earnings on the Tour's money
list.2 97 In a letter to NCWO chairwoman Martha Burk, PGA Tour
commissioner Tim Finchem wrote, "It is recognized around the
world as a major championship ... and is a significant part of the
structure of professional golf. We have concluded that we must
continue to recognize the Masters Tournament as one of profes-
sional golf's major championships."298 Eradicating discrimination is
not a priority for these entities;2 9 their efforts are focused on televi-
sion contracts, marketing, and other business issues instead of
social issues. 300 In addition, the adoption of these measures would
impact only a select few of the country's estimated 5,000 private
Reform). The letter from NCWO Chair Martha Burk to Mr. Johnson that lead to this re-
sponse can be viewed at http://www.womensorganizations.org/news/augustaletter.pdf (on
file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
295. See Baltasar Garzon, "Integration Lacking at Course Which Is Indeed Exclusive,"
SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, Sept. 26, 1999, at T2. The LPGA is likely to face a similar dilemma in
the future, as the rotation of the British Open amongst clubs throughout Great Britain will
eventually lead to a conflict when the event is held at The Royal and Ancient Golf Club of St.
Andrews, Scotland, which specifically excludes women from many parts of its clubhouse. See
Galloway, supra note 286.
296. See PGA Calendar of Future Events, available at http://www.pga.com/tour/
calendar/future.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). See
Taniguchi Leads Nissan, Hoping to Join the Tour, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2002, at D8.
297. See Tour Players Lukewarm About Women at Augusta, Sept. 10, 2002, available at
http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/story?id=1427651 (on file with the University of Michigan
journal of Law Reform).
298. Id.
299. Personal Interview with Libba Galloway, May 18, 2001.
300. Id.
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clubs that host professional tournaments. The PGA Tour had 51
official events on its 2003 schedule,"'1 while the LPGA had 34 on its
2003 schedule.0 2 Thus, the vast majority of country clubs would be
unaffected by any Tour regulations. Despite this limited reach, it is
critical that the professional tours impose more rigorous member-
ship requirements upon the private clubs that host its
tournaments. This would send an important message to private
clubs and their members-that the country's most visible golfing
establishments do not tolerate discrimination. This proactive
stance may set an example that other venerable institutions-
principally, country clubs-seek to emulate.
Another potential solution associated with the professional tours
requires the involvement of the professional athletes competing in
tour events. While it is perhaps unfair to place the burden of cur-
tailing discrimination on individuals who had nothing to do with
establishing this long-held tradition, the power of these profes-
sional athletes to effect change not be underestimated. Social
responsibility among professional athletes in the context of com-
bating discrimination is not without precedent. Golf legend Tom
Watson resigned his membership at the Kansas City Country Club
when it rejected tax guru Henry Block because he was Jewish 
and tennis star Serena Williams honored an NAACP-led boycott by
refusing to play in the 2000 Family Circle Cup in South Carolina
during the controversy surrounding the presence of the Confeder-
ate flag atop the state's capitol.
Yet, perhaps due to their relatively short career length or the
fear of reprisal from their sponsors, most athletes on the profes-
sional tours are unwilling to engage in similar acts. PGA Tour
players were largely unwilling to pledge their support to the
NCWO in its controversy with the Masters, refusing to become in-
volved in any boycotts of the tournament.30 4 John Daly, one of the
301. See 2003 PGA Tour Schedule, available at http://www.pgatour.com/tournaments/
pgatour.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
302. See LPGA announces complete 2003 Tour schedule, Feb. 5, 2003, at http://
www.lpga.com/news/index.cfm?cont-id=162117 (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
303. SeeMoss, supra note 15, at 161. Watson's wife and children are Jewish. Id.
304. See 7bur Players Lukewarm About Women at Augusta, supra note 297. Former Masters
champion Mark O'Meara stated, "I'm all for a woman becoming president or equal pay for
women but this is a First Amendment issue. This is a private club and they can choose who
they want to include. If you don't like the policy, don't go to the tournament." Id. Former
PGA Championship winner Bob Tway was even more forceful in his rebuke, saying, "I'd go
to the Masters through hell or high water to show them they're full of a hill of beans. What
does it matter to put a woman CEO making millions in the club? What does that prove?" Id.




PGA Tour's most popular players, stated, "I would not consider
that. If I got into Augusta, I would play. It's a major. It's a tourna-
ment we dream as little kids of winning. Women protesting it
shouldn't take it out on us for playing in it."3 5 However, Daly may
have also echoed the beliefs of many players when he stated, "He's
got so much power in the game right now. If Tiger was to say, 'I'm
not going to play Augusta if they don't allow women,' then I'd side
with Tiger. But it would have to be all the players. And that's not
going to happen."
Yet Tiger Woods, the only African-American golfer on the PGA
Tour, has refused to become involved in race-related protests and
seems resigned to believing that, while he would like for country
clubs to become more accessible, he is powerless in the face of a
long-held tradition and larger societal issues. In response to ques-
tions about gender-based discrimination at Augusta National and
race-based discrimination at other clubs, Woods answered,
[I]t's one of those things where everyone has-they're enti-
fled to set up their own rules the way they want them. It would
be nice to see everyone have an equal chance to participate if
they wanted to, but there is nothing you can do about it. If
you have a group, an organization, that's the way they want to
set it up, it's their prerogative to set it up that way .... It's un-
fortunate that it is that way, but it's just the way it is. There are
clubs that have segregated, whether it's sex or race, one of
those two issues, and-or even age, those are issues and those
are things that have happened and will continue to occur and
they will continue to exist for a long period of time .... It
would be nice to see every golf course open to everyone who
wanted to participate, but that's just not where society is. If
you just pigeonholed this single issue, I think you're not do-
ing justice in the bigger scope, and I think there are a lot of
other things that go into it. It's notjust simple, he's too young
or he's not the right race or he doesn't believe in the right re-
ligion, there's a lot more to it than just that."6
Woods declined to honor the aforementioned NAACP
economic boycott when he played in the 2000 MCI Heritage
305. Id.
306. See Tiger Woods Press Conference: British Open, Jul. 16, 2002, Muirfield, East Lo-
thian, Scotland, available at http://www.tigerwoods.com/news/fulltext.sps?sid=825&lid=
I&aid= 16222&atpval=0 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
FALL 2003]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform[
Classic, a PGA event held in South Carolina. °7 When asked about
the boycott, Woods responded, "I'm a golfer. That's their deal, you
know?"30 In 1994, Woods rejected a request not to play in a college
tournament at Shoal Creek Country Club.3  Woods is the most
popular athlete in the world, and perhaps the most powerful
person in the sports industry.3 ° His words and actions yield
tremendous influence, and despite his apparent beliefs, he has
considerable ability to effect social change at numerous country
clubs by threatening to boycott tournaments played at those clubs
having a discriminatory membership policy."" A club faced with a
potential Woods boycott would be forced to make the difficult
decision to either change its membership policies to make the club
truly open or host a tournament missing the sport's biggest
drawing card.31 ' Though some clubs would choose the latter option
307. See Wickham, supra note 2.
308. S.L. Price, Tunnel Vision, Sports Illustrated, April 3, 2000, at 89.
309. See id.
310. Sporting News recently named Woods the most powerful individual in sports.
Michael Kinsley, TSN 100 Most Powerful SPORTING NEWS (on file with the University of
MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
311. When asked if his stature could allow him to force change, Woods has stated, "I've
done my part so far trying to get more kids who haven't been able to have access to the
game, that's what my foundation is all about, so ... I'm trying to do my share in my sector
where I'm really focused on [kids], and it's not easy ... it's not easy." Tiger Woods Press
Conference: British Open, supra note 306. At a later press conference, Woods gave a more
elaborate response to the question:
You were in support of women at Augusta and with your popularity and success, do
you think you have the power to change golf and change some of those clubs and
some of those rules?" He answered, "I'd like to, yes. Certainly I'd like to. I'd like to
see that happen. I'd like to think I have the influence to do that. But if you notice,
look at the history of Augusta National and just look at the way they've conducted
themselves over the history of the tournament and their policies and how they've run
the tournament, you'll see they make change when they want to make change. At the
players' dinners when we've had some informational conversations with the chairman
of the tournament, and let me tell you, they run it the way they want to run it. It's
their prerogative.
But I'd like to say I have made a little bit of difference in this game, as far as accessi-
bility into our sport, kids, minorities, participating in the game, and I'd like to do
more. I would love to do more. My foundation is trying to do that and we have got a
lot of plans to do even more.
Tiger Woods Press Conference: Buick Open, Sunda), Aug. 11, 2002, Warwick Hills Golf &
Country Club, Grand Blanc, Michigan, available at http://www.tigerwoods.com/news/
fulltext.sps?sid=825&lid=l &aid=1 7280 (last visited on Sept 6, 2002).
312. This would have a sizable financial impact on the event. Television ratings and at-
tendance figures are significantly higher when Woods plays, making sponsorship
opportunities at those events significantly more valuable.
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on principle, 3 3 it is certain that others would bend to the economic
forces and amend their membership policies. The threat of boycott
would be even stronger if other popular Tour players joined
Woods. In response to a question about the possibility of
boycotting the Masters because of Augusta National's membership
policy, Woods responded, "Will other players do the same? If they
don't, then what happens? Then the defending champion doesn't
play."3 1 5 It is possible that other leading PGA Tour players would
follow a boycott led by Tiger Woods. This could place a significant
strain on the club hosting the tournament.
E Internal Solutions to Country Club Discrimination
The simplest way to combat discrimination at a country club is
for members to recognize the need for a change in club policy and
pressure the membership to end its perpetuation of discrimina-
tion. While pushing for change from within seems simple in
theory, in reality it is quite difficult. There exists a long tradition of
discrimination in country clubs that is deeply ingrained into its cul-
ture; most individuals have strong feelings about their club's
membership policies and are quite resistant to changing them;
these individuals may simply not believe that it is necessary to
change the rules. A member seeking to change club policy risks a
wide of range of negative consequences-from social ostracism by
fellow club members to a loss of business.
The nine women who successfully challenged the discriminatory
practices at Haverhill Golf and Country Club have suffered from
such treatment since initiating their lawsuit.3s 6 Their triumph has
been Pyrrhic in many ways, with substantial emotional, social, and
313. See supra note 288 (discussing country clubs that refused to change their admis-
sions policies to adhere to the PGA's requirements).
314. This is highly unlikely, as most players seem uninterested in wielding their power
for social good. For example, Fred Couples, a high-profile player, is involved in the design of
a men-only golf course in Arizona. See Couples Helping to Design Men-Only Course, available at
http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/story?id=1242938 (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform). Other PGA Tour players such as David Toms and Charles Howell
III support Augusta National's exclusion of women. See Augusta Issue Likely to Dominate Golfs
Offseason, GOLFWEB WIRE SERVICES, Nov. 2, 2002, available at http://www.golfweb.com/
u/ce/muli/0,1977,5853689,00.html (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
315. Tiger Woods Press Conference: Buick Open, supra note 311.
316. See Marcia Chambers, The High Price of Victory, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 2001, at DI.
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financial losses accompanying their legal victory. While lost
friendships are a normal consequence of litigation, it is an espe-
cially troublesome consequence in the country club context. The
country club plays a large role in the social lives of many of its
members, as numerous friendships exist in every club; a primary
reason that people join clubs is to associate with their friends in a
relaxed social setting. When a disaffected member challenges the
country club's system, these social benefits end. The country club
becomes a place where the member is despised rather than liked;
ignored rather than acknowledged both on the golf course and the
clubhouse; and treated with hostility instead of kindness3 Not sur-
prisingly, several of the plaintiffs in Haverhill have resigned as
members of the country club since the court's decision.18
Financial costs are also a consequence of challenging country
club discrimination. Club members frequently do business with
each other; this is a primary reason why many individuals join
country clubs. An individual challenging discrimination at her club
will likely lose business; the other club members may seek financial
3201revenge by taking their business away.
Surprisingly, the efforts of those who challenge discriminatory
practices at their club is often unappreciated by other similarly
situated members of their club. At Haverhill Golf and Country
Club, other female members of the club did not support the plain-
tiffs; instead, the plaintiffs were labeled as troublemakers.321 One
plaintiff expressed her frustration in commenting, "What we
fought for was their rights, their tee times, their access to the
course .... But these new women don't care."32 2 In many ways, the
negative backlash makes the effort to end discrimination at one's
own club seem fruitless. This likely discourages many members
from challenging unfair practices at their own club. It is too risky
for most club members to get involved in fighting against discrimi-
nation. Change in the discriminatory climate that surrounds most




320. Id. This financial loss may also extend to the family members of the individual
challenging the discrimination. The husband of one of the plaintiffs in Haverhill lost several
clients as a result of his wife's lawsuit. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. atD4 (remarks of Lorna Kimball).
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G. External Solutions to Country Club Discrimination
In order to lessen the financial burden placed on their member-
ship, the majority of clubs seek to derive revenues by allowing
outside groups to hold meetings, events, or conduct business at the
clubs. These groups may exert economic pressure on country
clubs that engage in discrimination by refusing to lease the club's
facilities. While an individual group that acts on its own may be-
have ethically in refusing to subsidize discrimination, this is
unlikely to lead to the end of a club's discriminatory policy. 324 How-
ever, there is likely to be 'strength in numbers'-if a critical mass of
groups joins the boycott, the country club may be forced to effec-
tuate any desired changes in order to avoid significant financial
consequences. This solution could be particularly effective in ad-
dressing discrimination at country clubs that play host to
professional golf events. If the companies that sponsor and adver-
tise on broadcasts of professional events refused to do so when they
are held at private clubs that embrace discriminatory policies, the
potential loss of revenue could force the clubs to make the desired
changes.
To ease the pressure placed on its three primary sponsors and to
prevent these companies from exerting any influence over the club
during the pendency of its membership controversy, Augusta
National suspended its contracts with IBM, Coca-Cola, and Citi-
group for the 2003 Masters tournament.3 2 Since these companies
were the only three advertisers on the Masters tournament televi-
sion broadcasts on CBS, the tournament was commercial-free.326
This unprecedented action occurred even though these companies
initially indicated that were unwilling to engage in such behavior,
claiming that they sponsored the tournament held at the club,
rather than the club itself.3 7 This reasoning is flawed. Though
Augusta National has operated the Masters since 1934 and does so
323. SeeJolly-Ryan, supra note 3, at 528.
324. The author was a senior member of a high school soccer team that was comprised
of a large number of Jewish players. The team refused to use a local country club that was
the traditional site of the annual team banquet when it was learned that the club discrimi-
nated against Jews in its membership policy. Despite its awareness of the reason for the
boycott, the club's policy remains unchanged.
325. See Move Comes from Conflict with Women's Group, Sept. 1, 2002, available at http://
sports.espn.go.com/golf/story?id=1425166 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform).
326. Id.
327. See Richard Sandomir, Sponsors Sidestep Debate, N.Y. TiMES, Jul. 18, 2002, at D2.
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independently of the PGA Tour, the club receives approximately $3
million per year from CBS to broadcast the tournamentC and sig-
nificant revenues from the sale of licensed products during the
tournament.""' Augusta National and the Masters tournament are
necessarily intertwined, as are all professional golf events and their
host facilities. Presumably, the decision to drop its television spon-
sors will cost Augusta National a significant amount of money,
which could force the club to pass this cost along to its members or
raise ticket prices for the Masters tournament. ° In addition, it is
expected that CBS will be pressured to drop its coverage of the
Masters tournament altogether, with allegations that its coverage of
the tournament supported and legitimized the club's exclusionary
practices.
Another area in which external pressures could influence
change involves corporate executives' compensation packages. As a
perquisite of employment, corporations frequently pay for the
country club memberships of their high ranking executives. These
corporate entities could also be pressured to end this practice at
clubs that have discriminatory membership policies if faced with
company boycotts or public protests. Since private clubs do not
have to disclose membership information, it likely will be difficult
to ascertain which companies' executives are associated with clubs
that have discriminatory policies in place. Though a leaked copy of
the membership list of Augusta National was published in 2003, ,
knowledge of country club membership lists is largely anecdotal.
33
However, shareholders of publicly traded companies are frequently
underwriting these memberships. They could presumably learn
the identity of the clubs that their executives belong to and de-
mand an end to this practice through a vote of the shareholders or
exerting substantial pressure on upper management. This would
force executives to pay for their own memberships in country clubs
328. See Broadcast Rights of Major Sports Properties, SPORTSBUsINESS JOURNAL, available at
http://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/article.cms?arficleld=11022&s=l (on file with the
University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
329. See Johnson Lashes Out at Call for Women in Club, Jul. 9, 2002, available at
http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/story?id=1403695 (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
330. See Move Comes from Conflict with Women 'S Group, supra note 325.
331. See Women's Group Targets CBS in Fight with Augusta, Aug. 31, 2002, available at
http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/story?id=1425570 (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
332. See Augusta National Golf Club members list, April 9, 2003, available at http://
www.usatoday.com/sports/golf/masters/2002-09-27-augusta-list.htm (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
333. See Tour, Players Lukewarm About Women at Augusta, supra note 1.
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that have discriminatory membership policies. Doing so could
enhance the welfare of the corporation, as it could prevent public
protests and boycotts of companies that underwrite memberships
in country clubs with discriminatory membership policies.
VI. CONCLUSION
The eradication of discrimination at private country clubs may
be sparked by the remarkable athletic achievements of several
high-profile minorities, including the Williams sisters and Tiger
Woods. They have served as pioneers in their sports, and their
long-term impact on society may prove as important as any indi-
vidual in the history of professional sports. While it is expected that
minority participation in these historically exclusive sports will con-
tinue to grow at a rapid pace, 5 this growth will likely yield
additional minority professional athletes in golf and tennis when
today's youths reach athletic maturity. The increased participation
and professionalization of these minority athletes may change the
mindset of many individuals-like those members of private coun-
try clubs who are adamantly opposed to allowing people who look
like Woods and the Williamses to eat in their dining rooms, play on
their courts, and shower in their locker rooms. Admiration of these
athletes may lead these individuals to alter their beliefs as to minor-
ity membership in their clubs. Yet their success is not a panacea for
the continuing problem of exclusion at a large number of country
clubs throughout the country.336
While litigation and new federal or state legislation may result in a
change in the policies of these country clubs, it is more likely that
alternative economic measures-such as the suspension or
termination of the clubs' liquor licenses, removal of clubs'
exemptions from both income and property taxes, external boycotts
by non-club members, and sanction by professional golf and tennis
organizations and athletes-must be taken to effectuate the desired
changes. Though the appropriate remedy is situation-dependent,
when considered collectively these solutions have the potential to
334. This could result in some executives resigning from clubs, although it is believed
that the membership initiation fee and annual dues at Augusta National are low enough and
its members wealthy enough that this would not occur.
335. SeeJames Sterba, Playing the Lie: Golf is Booming-Except that It Isn't, Unless You Count
TV, WALL ST.J., Apr. 13, 2000, at Al, A10.
336. See KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 255.
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affect change at a significant number of country clubs and alter the
landscape of a social institution. It can be argued that the goal of
eradicating discrimination in country clubs does not justify the
infringement of the constitutional rights of country club members.
However, the desire to attain equality for all members of society
should take priority over the liberty interests of country club
members. The issue of country club discrimination should be given
the consideration it deserves and the legal, economic, and social
support that is needed to make true change possible. The People's
Open that was the 2002 U.S. Open golf tournament could then
become a recurring theme in other segments of society and the
discriminatory policies of many private country clubs a distant
memory.
